



ASSESSING THE SCOPE AND PARAMETERS OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN SOMALIA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - NOVEMBER 2021

IMPLEMENTED BY ADAM SMITH INTERNATIONAL





'THE BEST BED THAT A MAN
CAN SLEEP ON IS PEACE'

SOMALI PROVERB

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Despite political progress and the establishment of state institutions, Somalia continues to be beset by protracted armed conflict. Violent contestation for power has taken place for at least 35 years since the demise of the Siad Barre government in the late 1980s, though many argue that Somalia has suffered a legacy of violence going back as far as the colonial era. Yet, despite multiple efforts to forge national reconciliation often through internationally backed conferences, this pursuit remains elusive.

In response to this challenge, following public consultations, a National Reconciliation Framework (NRF) was established in 2019 setting out five pillars of work to advance this objective. Pillar II, on dealing with the past, thus far lacks a specific strategy and mechanism for delivery. Furthermore, while the 2012 provisional constitution (article 111i) provides for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, this is yet to be established. It is within this gap that initial research to understand the potential scope and parameters of transitional justice is undertaken.

A combination of desk based and field research reflected on the concept and objectives of transitional justice, what has been done to date in Somalia, the backdrop of violence that it will need to address, the attitudes and needs of Somalis towards addressing past violence and what the scope, parameters, contradictions and limitations may be as well as the policy setting in which it must operate. The research finally draws on some of the experiences of other countries that have undertaken transitional justice initiatives and proposes some initial steps forward that international agencies, the Federal Government of Somalia and concerned Somali actors, could take to move the issue forward.

LESSONS FROM TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE LITERATURE:

Transitional Justice is understood as a tool within the wider reconciliation endeavour seeking to address the legacy of violence by acknowledging the array of violence perpetrated, bring to light the history of what occurred and securing the accountability of perpetrators while simultaneously seeking to restore and repair broken social relations. Nevertheless, advancing justice and accountability for past violence- let alone establishing the truth of what occurred- is a complicated and contentious endeavour, and even the best designed initiatives have suffered complications and challenges. A review of the origins and development of theoretical frameworks for transitional justice (TJ) and their application in different contexts across the last 80 years, without specific reference to Somalia, suggests several considerations to approach TJ programming in Somalia.

- Any TJ model will need to be context sensitive. It cannot simply follow a preconceived, externally developed formula, nor deploy a purely technical approach uninformed by political and social realities.
- TJ measures should not be overburdened with expectations. They should not try to cover reconciliation and holding perpetrators accountable as well as state-building and nation-building, within the context of a national reconciliation framework. A TJ programme of work should have a focussed objective, while additional aspects of state-building or wider aspects of reconciliation may need to be performed in parallel or sequentially.
- To be effective, TJ must involve a large section of the population, focusing on ordinary people and the realities of their daily lives. It should be designed and implemented from the 'bottom' up. Donor and international agencies should avoid being a visible and driving force as it may work at cross-purposes, undermining popular trust and legitimacy in the pursuit.
- In situations of ongoing crisis, where the state is weak and in competition with non-state actors, TJ cannot exclusively depend on existing state structures. Rather, state actors can participate among other actors in the TJ process, within the context of a national TJ framework.

- To deal with the violent past in a politically fragmented context like Somalia, a national framework needs to be developed beginning by tackling issues at the local and regional levels.
- TJ is a long-term and complex process. Strict timelines, benchmarks and excessive bureaucratisation, will likely prevent the process from building support and achieving results.
- Without local legitimacy, no stable support for TJ can be established. Somali political elites do not necessarily represent local communities across the country. Yet, their commitment is critical for a meaningful TJ process.



SOMALI REFLECTIONS ON THE NEED, SCOPE AND CHALLENGES OF DEALING WITH THE PAST

The research entailed fieldwork conducted in Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baydhabo, Galkayo and Garowe. The primary data provides insights into the parameters and scope for TJ programming in Somalia and highlights the contradictions and challenges that any process will have to engage in.

- Most respondents stated that dealing with the violent past is essential. They were keen to see that past crimes and injustices against individuals, -not only against groups- be dealt with to end the victims' grudges against the perpetrators, which keep feeding mistrust in the country.
- Respondents tended to focus in on the violence perpetrated during the 1990s. While some respondents referred to atrocities committed by Al-Shabaab and foreign troops in recent years, the violence committed by warlords and clan militias were more often treated as the issue that needed redress.
- Many admitted that it is challenging if not impossible to deal with all past crimes and injustices. Some suggested dealing only with the main perpetrators, principally former warlords, but they reminded that some of these are holding political office today.
- Women stressed that Gender-Based Violence/sexual violence (GBV) has a long-term negative impact on the victims and that, even after 30 years, they should have a chance at least to speak out and be heard. However, all agreed that this is challenging it is challenging to deal with GBV due to the culturally engrained stigmatisation of victims among Somalis and the challenge of identifying perpetrators.
- Most respondents emphasized that property crimes should be dealt with, no matter when and how they happened and that seeing someone holding stolen property often perpetuates grievances. Immovable property, i.e., houses and land, should be returned. This was, as many admitted, still complicated because of the lack of reliable title deeds and because of the determination of illegal owners to defend 'their' property they occupied, often occupied since decades.
- For the respondents, the most relevant and preferred source of law for dealing with the violent past is Shari'a. In particular, many felt that conflicts over property were best resolved through Islamic law.

In more general terms, individual accountability could most clearly be established under Shari'a. Somali customary law (Xeer) was seen as suitable for inter-group reconciliation. While several men in the research mentioned that they received compensation for some crimes under Xeer, female respondents almost unanimously expressed reservations about Somali customary law. They stressed that it benefits primarily men and that it can be unfair, since it privileges stronger over weaker groups and only provides 'settlements', not justice.

- The respondents clearly expressed a wish for a clear, effective, and fair overarching legal structure. Yet, equally clearly, they mentioned that the current state system existing in Somalia was far from being able to deliver on this.
- Many saw international law as a suitable instrument to deal with the main perpetrators. Several respondents mentioned that the International Criminal Court, or a special tribunal for war crimes in Somalia, should adjudicate the warlords including potentially some powerful actors in the government today who had committed crimes or ordered atrocities in the past. While some felt that an international mechanism could transcend domestic clannism, which could be an important challenge to a fair process, other respondents also cautioned that an external process could create more insecurity in an already volatile political situation in Somalia.
- Some respondents mentioned foreign troops among the perpetrators of crimes in the past and presence. Some praised AMISOM's role in fighting Al-Shabaab in 2007 and 2008. But others mentioned atrocities and abuses against Somali civilians committed by foreign forces, some with extensive detail. Many felt that there should be some mechanism to address atrocities and abuses by foreign troops and perpetrators however the type of mechanism and feasibility of it would need greater interrogation.
- Reflections on the structural marginalisation of women and minorities and its connection to past violence was limited. Despite the question being raised, many respondents lacked a clear understanding of what violence marginalised groups had specifically faced let alone what kind of justice, accountability or reparations for women or minority groups might entail or be needed.

In practice, justice concerning minority group members would have to include dealing with past violations at an individual and a collective, structural level. This would require a legal framework that provided for truth-telling and adjudication of perpetrators and entailed provisions for affirmative action, which Shari'a Law and courts alone would not be able to provide. Similarly, the deeply engrained patriarchal structures of Somali society would have to be tackled when dealing with the violence experienced by women and girls over the past decades in the context of civil war in Somalia.

- Several contradictions emerged from the interviews. On the one hand, respondents found it important to deal with the violent past and hold individual perpetrators accountable. On the other hand, a majority advocated 'forgiving and forgetting' as

an appropriate way of dealing with many past crimes. Furthermore, forgiving was not seen as unconditional rather contingent upon redress, after which forgiveness could occur. It is not clear in the data whether the former only refers to individuals and the latter to communities, or groups. Shari'a and, to a lesser degree, Xeer were mentioned as the most appropriate legal basis for dealing with the violent past. But respondents also emphasised that a fair and robust judiciary administered by an effective state was necessary to deal with past crimes. Although Article 2 of the Provisional Constitution establishes the primacy of Shari'a over any other source of law, in practice Somalia is one of the few contexts where different legal orders co-exist often without a clear hierarchy.

Clannism, which considers narrow interests among patrilineal relatives in all spheres of daily life, inhibits open and balanced discussions about past violent incidents. Key events struggle to be discussed publicly without provoking the patrilineal relatives of those accused of crimes and atrocities to rush to a general defence of their fellow clan members. This constitutes a considerable challenge for typical TJ procedures such as truth-telling, criminal prosecution, and vetting. In other contexts, group identities also superseded all others (e.g. Rwanda and South Africa), but in these contexts there was a clear political settlement providing more enabling conditions.

5. **The ambiguous role played by the international community.** External actors have been involved in Somalia at various points over the past 35 years. While much of this has contributed towards humanitarian relief and peacekeeping, there have also been times when foreign actors have been a direct party to the conflict. During the 1980s, the military regime received strong military and other support from foreign states. In the early 1990s, international peacekeepers were known to have perpetrated human rights violations. (HRW 1995) At times foreign support has strengthened warlords. More contemporarily, foreign troops through AMISOM have harmed civilians through actions in pursuit of their mandate, or through sexual violence (Wilson 2014). Already Canada has undertaken a prosecution against troops who were sent to keep the peace in 1993 but who instead tortured and killed a Somali youth (Amnesty 1995). Similarly, under the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, AMISOM now documents and makes reparations for civilian casualties that have emerged from its own actions (UNSOM 2019). Going forward, any TJ process will need to acknowledge the full legacy of past violence in Somalia regardless of whom the perpetrator may be. If, or where, this relates to foreign states and troops, a TJ process will need to consider whether, where and through which instruments it may be beneficial to pursue accountability.

4. **Structural violence against women and minorities.** Structural violence is a form of violence wherein some social structure or social institution may harm people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs. This is the case in Somalia concerning women and members of minority groups, particularly when dealing with their past violent experiences. Gender-Based Violence comes along with the stigmatisation of the victims in Somalia. Violence and injustices against minorities are often not considered in the same way as violence and injustices among 'equals' (i.e., men belonging to similarly strong majority groups). These long-established inequalities in Somali society will likely also impinge on any TJ initiative in Somalia. Generations of entrenched norms around power and position in society cannot be undone through short term measures. A TJ process in Somalia that does not address structural violence and injustice will therefore fail to address key dimensions.

6. **Competing Trauma-Narratives.** There is a multitude of partly opposed collective trauma narratives, which different clans or lineages hold onto. In these narratives, frequently, the 'murderer' of one group is the 'hero' of the other. This provides little space for shared and nuanced accounts of what happened and shared responsibility. It also upholds the clear-cut and politicised boundaries between 'victims' and 'perpetrators', which again inhibits more complex discussions about ambiguous realities regarding who did what. This situation is not exceptional to Somalia, it is common to many conflicts and other processes of transitional justice. However, it is important that the challenge of documenting the past and establishing the facts in such context is not underestimated.

KEY CHALLENGES TO TJ IN SOMALIA

Aggregating all the data collected and analysed for this research, we have identified six key challenges that have profound implications for TJ programming in Somalia.

1. **Absence of overarching and legitimate legal and political structures,** and lack of legitimacy of state institutions. The political landscape in Somalia is fragmented, and there is no dominant legitimate authority. The reach of the government is limited. This challenges any approach to TJ that is solely dependent on overarching state power. The contested nature of politics in Somalia, with the government fighting with Al-Shabaab, who remains the de-facto authority in the rural hinterland of south and central Somalia, foreign troops on the ground, clan militias controlling parts of south and central Somalia, the regional governments of Jubbaland and Puntland distanced from the government in Mogadishu, and Somaliland in the northwest having seceded unilaterally, suggest that, at present, a state-centred approach to TJ alone will not lead to a comprehensive dealing with the violent past in Somalia. It also means that TJ today or any time soon cannot be driven solely by state institutions. Therefore, it will be challenging for a national TJ framework to take off in Somalia in the present circumstances. However, the NRF could still provide a framework within which a few initial steps could be taken, as we advise below. Certainly, if in the near future an administration comes to power that manages to produce more popular legitimacy, the NRF or

even the provisions in the provisional constitution (article 111) regarding the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission could be activated to provide an overarching framework for various TJ measures in Somalia.

2. **Non-hierarchical plural legal situation and the strong influence of Shari'a.** Not one of the existing legal systems in the country prevails over the others. Elsewhere, typically, statutory law dominates, and religious or customary law fills particular niches or can be used by certain actors or in specific situations. In Somalia Shari'a, statutory law and Xeer exist side by side. In some areas, they can be accessed simultaneously. In others, statutory law is excluded (for example, in Al-Shabaab controlled terrain and the rural peripheries). This implies that any approach to TJ would have to accommodate elements of all three relevant legal systems. While it is not unusual to combine statutory and customary legal approaches within national TJ frameworks (e.g., in Rwanda and Liberia), to date, the incorporation of Shari'a as a third element has never been attempted. Given that the Somali Provisional Constitution established the primacy of Shari'a over other sources of law, including statutory, advancing a legal framework for TJ in Somalia will require navigating this unexplored territory.
3. **Clannism.** While allegiance towards ones patrilineal kin has a long tradition among Somalis, clans underwent a substantial transformation in their importance during the late 1980s and the early 1990s.

THE CASE OF SOMALILAND

Across Somalia there have been different policy approaches in response to dealing with the violent past, in particular that of Somaliland/ north-western Somalia. Over the past three decades, the people of Somaliland have gathered valuable experiences with a process that could be described as TJ, without a formal process, but entailing important aspects of region-wide reconciliation and dealing with the violent past, albeit limited to intra-Somaliland issues. We have identified some relevant lessons to learn from:

- The process of dealing with past violence and injustice grew from the bottom up. It was based on locally legitimate, 'face-to-face' proceedings between relevant collectives (lineage or clans). A general amnesty complemented this for crimes committed by persons from the region during the first civil war in the 1980s. While amnesty is a contested measure in the context of TJ, it may be that without such tools there may be little traction in securing the engagement of elites who may have been involved in past violence.

- The process was phased over a long term. It would be unrealistic to expect that the complex histories of violence in Somalia could be dealt with in 'one go' and in a relatively short time (one, two or three years). It may be useful to consider a phased approach that allows for different components to be addressed and built upon each other, recognising that it could take years for the full array of issues to be addressed.
- Somaliland has seen different measures at different times, and it did not undertake all the possible steps for political reasons. TJ in Somalia must consider the political economy of justice and the legitimacy of any TJ mechanism: who wants what type of TJ and when, to what end? What kind of TJ do the concerned people envisage and why? Politics and power are thus involved when considering 'whose priorities take priority' in dealing with the past.

LESSONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

The research, in addition, explored TJ processes in other countries which may present relevant features to the case of Somalia and help identify a range of different tools and approaches that can balance truth, justice and peace in the pursuit of post-conflict reconciliation.

South Africa and truth-telling. Truth-telling could be one approach to deal with the masses of 'ordinary' perpetrators in Somalia. Over the past four decades, many individuals committed many crimes during different periods of the Somali conflict making the pursuit of justice through normal channels unlikely. This situation is not dissimilar from the crimes of the Apartheid regime in South Africa from the 1960s to the early 1990s. To allow individual and low-rank/no rank perpetrators to admit to their crimes, for example, as members of the Somali National Army in the 1980s, as members of warlord militias, as members of smaller gangs or as members of one of the extremist groups (Hizbul Islam, AS, and earlier Al Ittihad), would do two things: first, it would shed light on episodes of violence that are otherwise

difficult to grasp and verify. Second, it would give the victims of these violent acts (rape, killings and lootings) a chance to give testimony.

Rwanda, Sierra Leone and the integration of customary practices and institutions. Rwandan state courts could not deal with the massive number of suspects who were often held for years without due process. The Rwandan government resorted to a traditional dispute settlement strategy known as Gacaca, which Rwandans originally used to deal with family and inheritance disputes. In 2000, approximately 11,000 such community courts were established. They were presided over by community leaders and endowed with coercive powers, hearing cases of murder, manslaughter, assault and property offences committed during the genocide. However, after some initial success, many Rwandans lost interest in the lengthy and unprofessional proceedings, complicated by threats to witnesses in many localities where Hutus were dominant. In Sierra Leone, public testimonies in front of community members were used to reintegrate community members who had committed crimes against their

people. However, reintegration, from the perspective of perpetrators, became a more important objective than uncovering past crimes, which resulted in public testimonies focussing not on admitting past deeds but on presenting themselves as acceptable community members.

Peru, collecting a complex collective memory and legal reform. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in Peru was special in the regard that it involved a number of distinguished, ambitious and open-minded commissioners some of whom had a long personal track record of human rights activism. The TRC commissioned considerable basic research in all regions of the country to first, documenting the violence that had happened and second, gathering voices of those affected about their priorities regarding dealing with the past violence. Thus, the TRC managed to create a certain popular momentum and was sensitive to diverse and naturally occasionally contradictory perspectives and demands. It also went a considerable way to give voice to structurally marginalised, i.e. indigenous groups from the highlands and the Amazon. Yet, in the aftermath of the TRC, and as a result of the change of government in Peru, many measures proposed by the commission began to be slowly implemented. As of 2021, legal reforms to deal with the violent past are still unfolding. In Somalia, there is a need for creating space or spaces for exploring and documenting complex narratives of the conflict. Developing a single and integrated narrative (as is attempted in Rwanda under President Kagame) may not fit Somalis' needs. Any representation of the past violence, for example, in museums, books or podcasts, must account for the diversity of experiences and the blurred boundary between victims and perpetrators in Somalia - similarly to the example of the Lugar de Memoria¹ (LUM) in Lima.

The LUM is a national museum documenting the 1980-2000 armed conflict in Peru. It sets out to tell a more complex history of the political violence, giving a voice to many individuals who have experienced the violence in different ways. Peru has also seen a number of legal reforms in the aftermath of the TRC there (2001-2003) that provide victims and relatives of victims of the violence with compensation in the form of free and preferential access to higher education and health care. The state also put additional resources in searching for and identifying those who were disappeared during the civil war and those buried anonymously, to be reburied officially.

The former Yugoslavia and accountability for the main perpetrators under international law.

A special tribunal was established in 1993 to deal with the violence in former Yugoslavia. It operated until 2017, based on international law, and dealt with around 150 cases of which it adjudicated roughly two thirds, issuing numerous sentences between acquittal and life sentence. It offers a possible model to combine truth-telling in exchange for impunity with an international tribunal adjudicating a group of main perpetrators from the different periods, groups and clans discussed in the research. For such a process to succeed, it must avoid any impression of clan bias. The standards of establishing the truth must be transparent to all observers, and the Somali public must follow the proceedings.

¹ Lugar de Memoria is known in English as the 'Place of Memories, Tolerance and Social Inclusion'.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Against this backdrop, any TJ process in Somalia must start in a low profile way, but ensure that it is designed in an inclusive and transparent manner.

. It could also initially be localised in the sense that in different localities and different regions of the country, different priorities regarding dealing with the violent past could be recognised. Drawing from the experiences outlined above, the preliminary steps international partners could undertake to advance TJ in Somalia could be:

LOCALISING TJ IN SOMALIA:

Given that the various regions of the country have different histories of violence consideration should be given to a locally and/or regionally differentiated approach to TJ in Somalia, recognising also that different states are also at different stages regarding security and political stability. While Somaliland/ north-western Somalia largely is stable, many parts of southern Somalia still face active conflict and protracted insecurity. Violence in northern Somalia escalated mainly in the 1980s and early 1990s, while in south and central Somalia, violence erupted mainly around 1990 and is partly still ongoing. The main actors of violence in the north (including Puntland) were government forces and a small number of relatively well-organised clan militias. In Puntland, additionally, Al Ittihad Al Islamiya and later Al Shabaab played a certain role, but not to the degree the militant Islamists continue to shape dynamics of violence in southern Somalia. Southern Somalia has seen the most complex layers of violence, from clan militias to militant Islamists to foreign intervention and Somali government forces. Against this backdrop, a localised, bottom-up TJ process in Somalia that takes these differences into account may be more effective.

A starting point for such a localised TJ process would include the localised documentation of past violations and crimes. Researchers familiar with the local context could be trained to collect legally and socially relevant evidence, and, the standards of proof would have to be agreed. Local documentation centres may need to be created and witness protection measures may need to be considered.

ESTABLISHING A FORUM OF EXPERTS:

Create an inclusive but still concise discussion forum with a quota for relevant groups, consciously including women and minorities. Women could be either involved as members of certain patrilineal descent group or as 'fifths clan', i.e., as an independent social group. However, both options can be challenging since even as a particular social group, Somali women can get involved in clan-politics of their own patrilineal descent groups.

Initially this could be an expert forum that does not comprise too many individuals. It should include credible representatives of victims groups and highly capable experts, civil society and religious leaders.

From Somaliland, not only the Isaaq should be invited, since Somaliland is genealogically more diverse and members of non-Isaaq groups have had their own experiences of past violence from the late 1980s onward.

In the sense of localising TJ, the 'central committee' for TJ in Somalia should facilitate the establishment of regional sub-committees that coordinate the abovementioned work of evidence collection and documenting the local and regional histories of violence based on witness statements and other forms of evidence.

This concise committee of Somali experts ideally would not have any decision taking powers initially convening as a discussion forum without making their deliberations public. Publicity of initial debates could lead to a rise of tensions in Somalia. Only once certain issues have been identified as most relevant, the committee could make them public. At an appropriate time, it should tour through Somalia to explain its ideas and concerns in several major towns of Somalia and engage local communities. It must be guaranteed that also rural dwellers are made aware of the events and if they wished, must have support in attending the public presentation of ideas of the proposed committee.


If the Somali committee decides that international law should play a role in dealing with past violence in Somalia, an international legal framework would have to be thought that at least does not clash with important Shari'a principles. Politically and practically, any approach to TJ in Somalia must take Shari'a into consideration.

THE ROLE OF THE STATE AND EXTERNAL DONORS:

The National Reconciliation Framework provides the space for the mentioned forum of experts, and the Provisional Constitution provides orientation, in mentioning the need for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the future, and the primacy of Shari'a Law over statutory and customary law.

However, the process should not be politicized. Both the FGS and its donors should avoid influencing the agenda of the central experts forum and the regional forums. Financial support could be given to documenting past violations and crimes, facilitating research, establishing documentation centers, protecting them and also guaranteeing the security of the witnesses.

Both the FGS and the donors should avoid a steering of the process, but rather ensure that it is Somali led. Only if a mixture of actors credibly representing the diverse sections and milieus of Somali society comes together and openly discusses the matters at hand, a successful TJ process that is Somali owned and thus can develop legitimacy in the eyes of the people concerned can unfold. The FGS and its donors will to a degree have to step back and watch. Only if asked, external advice - e.g. regarding international legal measures to hold the main perpetrators accountable - could be inserted.



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


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