MONITORING, EVALUATION & LEARNING

SOMALIA
STABILITY
FUND

IMPLEMENTED BY ADAM SMITH INTERNATIONAL

DELIVERING PEACE & STABILITY IN SOMALIA

'TO BE WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE IS TO BE WITHOUT LIGHT'

SOMALI PROVERB

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Somalia Stability Fund (SSF) is a multi-donor fund that supports the development of a peaceful, stable, and secure Somalia; it is designed to support enhanced government legitimacy and reduced political and communal conflict.To deliver on the Fund's mandate, SSF has taken a flexible and adaptive approach, enabling the Fund to effectively respond to the shifting stability needs in Somalia.

In SSF phase I, the approach was underpinned by three key principles which informed the portfolio-level management and individual investment-level decisions. These principles were:

- **Local Ownership:** SSF implemented programmes through local Somali organisations and implemented programmes reflecting local priorities

- **Learn and Adapt:** the Fund was adaptive and learnt from its initiatives — and those of other organisations implementing similar programmes; and

- **Transparency and Accountability:** the Fund provided regular and accessible information regarding its funding decisions, and what has and has not been working.

Both SSF phases I and II shared the same overall goal of enhancing stability in Somalia. The phase II strategy was based on a macro-level analysis of conflict and instability in Somalia; it sought to position the Fund vis-à-vis the structural drivers of conflict and instability in Somalia and the Fund's mandate and comparative advantage.

Iterations in SSF II were based on the realisation that change takes time, hence the need for constant engagement with multiple stakeholders — both to get their buy-in for the work of the Fund and to ensure that the stakeholders remain on course to work towards our shared goals.

The SSF II extension period approach was informed partly by the findings of the review conducted by FCDO, as well as by internal reflections and findings from previous evaluations and assessments conducted on the Fund's interventions. While previously, the Fund took a more standalone approach in some of its interventions, the extension period adopted a workstream approach which included mainstreaming of GESI to ensure coherence and synergy.

In terms of the results framework, the Fund in phase I and II conducted baseline, midline, and endline assessments, the findings of which were then shared with a panel of experts who scored SSF's performance based on a set of criteria. However, this approach was found to be complicated, confusing, and expensive, hence in the SSF II extension period, the Fund made changes to its results framework to include qualitative indicators and specific case studies of its investments. The qualitative indicators show the nuances of progress towards attainment of outcomes and impact, while the use of case studies highlights what has previously worked best, or not worked at all. This latter change was also informed by the short implementation timeline for the extension period. The principal changes made in the results framework for the SSF II extension period were the discontinuation of indicators that were not applicable for the extension period, and revision of some of the indicators to reflect the work to be undertaken within the extension period.

STABILITY IN SOMALIA

LOCAL OWNERSHIP

LEARNING & ADAPTING

TRANSPARENCY & ACCOUNTABILITY

INTRODUCTION

The Somalia Stability Fund (SSF) is a multi-donor fund that supports the development of a peaceful, stable, and secure Somalia; it is designed to support enhanced government legitimacy and reduced political and communal conflict. SSF has delivered investments worth £56 million across phase I and a fund size of £91million in phase II. The 2021 extension period is anticipated to deliver investments worth £11 million[1]. In order to deliver on the Fund's mandate, SSF has taken a flexible and adaptive approach, enabling the Fund to effectively respond to the shifting stability needs in Somalia.

Throughout the duration of SSF, the results framework has included results on output and outcome (including impact). At each phase, the Fund's approach has been underpinned by a set of principles informing individual investment decisions as well as wider portfolio-level strategic direction. SSF's principles, outcomes, and overall approach has continuously evolved to ensure that it addresses the strategic priorities of SSF's donors, while continuously responding to the context in Somalia so that key stability priorities are addressed.

In addition to SSF's robust results framework, the Fund has maintained a diligent approach to reporting progress and results to donors, providing quarterly and annual written reports. These are shared with the Joint Donor Committee (JDC) to provide updates on SSF's progress and challenges. In addition, the Fund has delivered frequent presentations to donors on the Fund's progress, results, risk profile, political updates, in-detail case studies, and lessons from its investments.

SSF
PHASE I
APPROACH

Under SSF phase I, the approach was underpinned by three key principles which informed the portfolio-level management and individual investment-level decisions:

LOCAL OWNERSHIP:

- Wherever possible, the Fund implemented directly through Somali organisations, using graduated funding to allow direct institutional/organisational support

- The Fund supported programmes which reflect local priorities and approaches identified by local stakeholders. It invested as much as possible in Somali-owned organisations and networks, Somali private sector and government entities

LEARN AND ADAPT:

- An evidence-based approach designed to maximise the impact of learning on its engagements. SSF invested in programmes which use and generate high quality evidence on Somalia, and adapt themselves in light of it.

- The Fund also sought to learn from other initiatives, both inside and outside of Somalia

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY:

- The Fund provided regular and accessible information about its operations, funding decisions, what is working, and what is not

- It created opportunities for public participation and regular feedback from local communities and partners to enhance the quality of its decision-making and programming

SSF I M&E FRAMEWORK

In alignment with the key principles mentioned above, SSF set up a flexible monitoring and evaluation framework, with outcome and output-level approaches as outlined below:

At **outcome level,** SSF tracked progress towards its ultimate goal: a peaceful, secure, and stable Somalia. Given the array of other actors and stakeholders involved across Somalia, SSF acknowledged that these changes were contributions and could not be solely attributed to the Fund. They may only result from the collective action of Somali and international actors over the longer term.

SSF's outcome-level approach was to respond to two key goals that were identified as critical in addressing Somalia's stability challenges:

- Support representative and responsive local governance

- Support the resolution and mitigation of conflicts

In order to address these priorities, SSF articulated two key outcomes that needed to be addressed, and against which performance should be measured, shown in table 1 below:

TABLE 1: SSF I OUTCOMES

Outcome	Indicators
A better governed and more stable Somalia	Improved score for Somalia on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)
Greater number of areas of stability	No. of regions in South-Central Somalia part of a Federal State

At **output level**, SSF assessed contribution through two key factors that were articulated in the Fund's investment strategy. SSF I did not give targets for these outputs, as to do so was considered likely to skew decision making away from context-specific realities that should inform the Fund's decisions—and therefore would—run counter to the flexible, adaptive nature of the Fund. The Fund did add some key additional steps, including gender disaggregating all results to ensure that issues of gender inclusivity could be effectively mainstreamed throughout the programme.

In addition, SSF set up a third output to measure the Fund's operational and organisational management, with intent to increase its contribution to outcomes in Somalia and to overall development effectiveness. The three outputs are shown in the table below.

TABLE 2: SSF I OUTPUTS

Output	Indicators
Legitimate, viable governance structures able to make and enforce rules locally	◆ Number of governance structures supported ◆ Number of newly recovered areas worked in within 6 months of recovery ◆ Number of government officials trained ◆ Number of people directly involved or consulted in decision making on policies and investments that affect them and their communities ◆ Number of facilities renovated or constructed with contribution of local governance structures or community ◆ Number of districts receiving support from SSF
Existing and emerging conflicts brought to conclusion and risks of future	◆ Number of people trained in conflict resolution ◆ Number of conflicts managed peacefully ◆ Number of youths receiving education, vocational training, or economic opportunities
Stability Fund Management	◆ Number of direct implementing partners that are Somali organisations ◆ Value of funds approved directly to implementing partners that are Somali organisations ◆ Percentage of calls for proposals that are carried out in accordance with agreed procedures and timelines of the application development and approval process to contracting ◆ Percentage of Stability Fund investments which have passed Somalia-based due-diligence assessments ◆ Percentage of projects for which quarterly reports submitted on time ◆ Percentage of projects for which quarterly reports reviewed within 30 days of receipt ◆ Amount of funds fraudulently misappropriated ◆ Ratio of implementing partner administration costs (in Somalia and externally) to overall project costs ◆ Percentage of projects applying the Community Safety and Peacebuilding Working Group's Daily Subsistence Allowance guidelines ◆ Percentage of projects subject to either field team or third-party verifications in previous six months ◆ Public profile and engagement through website and social media ◆ Number of enquiries through Stability Fund outlets (email, social media) ◆ Number of people using SMS feedback system ◆ Percentage of funding recorded in the Somalia Development Assistance Database ◆ Percentage of third-party red flags resolved ◆ Percentage of SSF investments which have been subject to expenditure verification audits ◆ Number of districts in which SSF or independent monitors have done monitoring or assessments

SSF
PHASE II
APPROACH

Both SSF phase I and II shared the same overall goal of enhancing stability in Somalia. The phase II strategy was based on a macro-level analysis of conflict and instability in Somalia; it sought to position the Fund vis-à-vis the structural drivers of conflict and instability in Somalia and the Fund's mandate and comparative advantage. The strategy responded to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) National Development Plan 2017-19 and Stabilisation Strategy 2017. It also drew on: a wealth of experience and learning gathered during phase I; findings from the August 2016 SSF Evaluation; a range of consultations with government stakeholders and Somalia experts and practitioners; and an SSF Perceptions Survey conducted in May/June 2016. The second phase built upon the progress and the lessons of phase I, but revised and refined its strategy including delivery principles, outputs, and outcomes to reflect the evolving context in Somalia and the updated priorities of its donors.

The key principles upon which decision making in phase II was based were:

- Context-appropriate: SSF strategy and programming was based on regular analysis and scenario-planning, ensuring a flexible and adaptive approach which responded to changes on the ground.

- Right people right places: SSF empowered Somali staff in the Secretariat Office (SO) and the Fund Manager country team, who spoke the language and brought strong local understanding and knowledge of political networks, ensuring that this informed policy and programming decisions.

- Put politics first: The Fund engaged with Somali politics to understand incentives and identify investments, and used project funding and the SO's influence to help build confidence in political processes and underpin the agreements that came out of them, including through use of performance funding where opportunities emerged.

- Learning and adapting: SSF developed a learning agenda which supported the iteration and adaptation of strategy and programming in line with emerging evidence and lessons.

- Coalition-building: SSF used diverse fora to share SSF analysis and learning, and encouraged a commonality of intent in pursuing policy objectives, such that SSF's contribution to stability was part of a wider strategy to tackle the drivers of conflict.

- Local ownership: SSF ensured alignment with government priorities, and government visibility, and leadership across all investments, whilst at the same time supporting government-community engagement and responsive delivery as the key to building trust between communities and government and ensuring sustainability.

- Gender and conflict sensitive: SSF investments aimed to positively address conflict dynamics and shift gendered power relations to promote women's empowerment.

- Risk and return: SSF took a balanced portfolio approach to risk, which ensured that high-risk projects were balanced by low-risk projects, being honest about why certain risks (political, security, etc) were worth taking.

SSF II THEORY OF CHANGE

SSF ensured that a 'gendered approach' was mainstreamed throughout the programme whereby all planning, analysis, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation recognised and considered the different gender-related needs and experiences of men, women, male and female youth, and male and female children.

AND **AS A RESULT,** STABILITY IN SOMALIA WOULD BE ENHANCED

THEN TARGETED STATE INSTITUTIONS WOULD BE MORE LEGITIMATE AND CAPABLE, GENDER EQUALITY WOULD BE ENHANCED, VIOLENT CONFLICT WOULD BE REDUCED, AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE ACCESSIBLE TO A WIDER SECTION OF THE POPULATION IN THE TARGETED AREAS

IF SOCIAL COHESION AND COMMUNITY-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN THE NEWLY-RECOVERED AREAS WERE ENHANCED

IF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS FUNCTIONED BETTER AND WERE MORE ACCOUNTABLE AND RESPONSIVE

IF COMMUNITIES' VULNERABILITY TO CONFLICT WAS REDUCED

IF THERE WAS INCREASED PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN AND EXCLUDED GROUPS IN FORMAL AND INFORMAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES

SSF II M&E FRAMEWORK

As in phase I, SSF tracked changes towards a peaceful, secure, and stable Somalia in phase II. In order to address this priority, SSF initially articulated two key outcomes that needed to be addressed, and against which performance should be measured, as shown in the table below.

TABLE 3: SSF II YEAR 1 OUTCOMES

Outcome	Indicators
SSF would contribute to ensuring that targeted government institutions were more legitimate and capable to perform their functions, violent conflict had been reduced, gender equality enhanced, and opportunities for socio-economic development were accessible to a wider section of the population in the targeted areas	Communities' positioning vis-à-vis the state and its competitors (qualitative, + % of communities positioned favourably towards the government) Status of communal conflicts in targeted areas Government capacity and legitimacy
Ultimately leading to the overall goal of enhancing stability in Somalia	Somalia's scoring under the Fragile States Index (FSI)

As per SSF's strategy, the Fund further outlined four key output-level priorities to address the problem statement, and an additional output to measure the Fund's operational and organisational management. The outputs are indicated in Table 4 below.

TABLE 4: SSF II YEAR 1 OUTPUTS

Output	Indicators
SSF performance on track with JDC expectations in terms of: strategic fit and prioritisation of work on key fault-lines; flexible and adaptive programming; performance against the workplan; and implementation of the learning plan	◆ Average score on SSF's performance on strategic fit and prioritisation of work on key fault-lines; flexible and adaptive programming; performance against the workplan; and implementation of the learning plan according to the benchmarks identified
Strengthened social cohesion and community-government relations in target Newly-Recovered Areas (NRA)	◆ Average social cohesion score in target NRAs ◆ Quality and effectiveness of the relationship between district administrations and local communities across targeted NRAs ◆ Number of men and women in targeted NRAs who have received benefits through SSF investments
Better-functioning, more accountable, and more responsive government institutions	◆ Quality of engagement between the FMS and targeted communities, and between district administrations and targeted communities ◆ Number of people benefitting from SSF investments, in partnership with government institutions ◆ Number of public assets constructed or rehabilitated that respond to government priorities and meet quality benchmarks
Increased participation and representation of women and excluded groups in governance structures	◆ Women's participation in formal and informal governance structures ◆ Total number of women, youth and minorities supported by SSF to improve their voice and participation in governance
Communities' vulnerability to conflict has been reduced	◆ Total number of men and women who have benefitted from socio-economic opportunities in targeted communities ◆ Quality of SSF interventions aimed at de-risking or de-escalating conflicts ◆ Average social cohesion score in target districts

BASELINE

SSF II's baseline and Year 1 targets were set in 2017 based on a comprehensive baseline study undertaken by a consortium of consulting firms, Wasafiri and Forcier (later Consilient). The baseline assessment was intended to collect qualitative data, supported by a quantitative questionnaire, to evaluate the status of communal relations, attitudes toward government, social cohesion within the targeted districts, and relationships between the community and the district and state governments, in line with SSF's results framework.

Assessment was carried out across 19 districts in Jubaland, South West State, Hirshabelle, Galmudug, and Puntland in the form of focus group discussions (FGD), questionnaires (QQ) with participants, and key informant interviews (KII) with stakeholders within the districts and at the state level.

SAMPLING APPROACH

Selection of districts for the study was conducted representatively on a state-by-state basis, informed by, among other characteristics, a district's perceived proximity to the state capital, security within and outside the district capital, clan dynamics, political conflict fault lines, and service delivery and government engagement with communities in the district.

In Jubaland, the 4 districts of study–Afmadow, Bardhere, Garbahare, and Kismayo–were selected, as fragile peace and relative stability existed. Despite their proximity to an intensive battle between Somali and international military forces and Al-Shabab (AS), life within the district capitals remained relatively calm. Communities benefited from high levels of social cohesion and valued the role that the local authorities played, while still looking forward to improved service delivery and engagement with the community when the capacity of the government was strengthened.

In South West State, the districts selected for baseline study–Afgoye, Baidoa, and Ceel Barde–were situated at opposite ends of the security spectrum. Ceel Barde, located directly at the Somali-Ethiopian border, brought with it strong Ethiopian troop presence as the larger neighbour had a vested interest in the district's stability, thereby keeping Al-Shabab at bay. Meanwhile, Baidoa had been the seat of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and was now the capital of the South West State. Afgoye, by contrast, remained barely accessible for South West State government representatives, which constrained their ability to generate purchase among present clans.

The 4 districts selected for the baseline study in Hirshabelle–Beletweyne, Jowhar, Mahaday, and Mataban–were diverse. The state capital Jowhar is located just north of Mogadishu. Having been the seat of the TFG, it maintained close political and economic ties to Mogadishu and was one of the more peaceful districts in this conflict-prone region. This district was socially cohesive, and communities were generally supportive towards the government. The then-newly-created district of Mahaday presented itself as starkly different, its strategic location making it an attractive point of control for AS Access to services was generally divided along clan lines. Similarly, Beletweyne was divided among clan lines, the Shabelle River splitting the district in two, with the majority clan— Hawiye-Xawaadle— occupying the east, and the others—Hawiye-Gal Jecel and Hawiye-Jajeelo—inhabiting the western part of the city. The agriculturalist Bantu-Makane resided on both sides. The district had seen an increase in clan conflict in the years leading up to the study. Finally, Mataban was a relatively peaceful district, ruled by Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (ASWJ). Located in northern Hiraan, the district was largely inhabited by the Hawiye-Habar Gidir-Eyr. This clan was a minority within Hirshabelle state, meaning that, politically, the district did not fit neatly into the Federal State formation process.

The 4 districts chosen for the baseline in Galmudug reflected communal dynamics and conflict fault lines. Galkayo was a site of conflict between Galmudug and Puntland that had flared up repeatedly until the peace negotiations between the two administrations in March 2017. The city was no longer the capital as, through the negotiations with other clans, the capital was officially moved to Dhusamareb. Yet the state did not control Dhusamareb, and as such the capital for all practical purposes was in Cadaado. Dhusamareb, despite being the official capital of Galmudug, was the de-facto capital of ASWJ that controls the western parts of the state. ASWJ—despite being a Sufist movement—is largely an outfit of the remaining powerful Habar Gidir clan. Galmudug has no presence in the district of Dhusamareb. Hope for rapprochement between the two administrations was strong following the election of the first Marehan president in Somalia since Siyad Barre. After initial success in negotiations, the parties descended into armed conflict over the village of Xerale, north of Dhusamareb. The district of Hobyo, on the coast of the Indian Ocean, marked the southern limit of Galmudug's area of influence on the coast. The neighbouring districts (Xaradhere and Ceel Dheer to the South, and Ceel Buur to the West of Hobyo) were controlled by AS. For all intents and purposes, Hobyo seemed quite secluded from the rest of the state, which is reflected in the attitudes of local people towards the state. Finally, the district of Abudwaq was officially under the Galmudug administration following their ousting of ASWJ in 2015. However, the district was characterised by active conflict between different Marehan groups that were allied with ASWJ and Galmudug, respectively.

In Puntland, the districts selected for the baseline study were all located at Puntland's periphery. As Puntland possesses the most intact infrastructure among all FMSs, and thereby the highest capacity for state officials to reach their respective districts, this choice reflected priority areas for continued state building programming. The importance of Bossaso in the north as Puntland's main port for trade—especially livestock exports—is self-explanatory. However, Bossaso's main communities, the Dashiishle and Ali Saleeban, felt somewhat relegated from their fellow Darood-Harti of the Mohamud Saleeban, who dominated government in and around the capital Garowe. Meanwhile, the towns of Benderbeyla and Eyl at the eastern coast initially exhibited similar dynamics, as both communities were highly cohesive, strongly supportive of local authorities, and did not witness any notable communal conflict whatsoever. The primary difference between Benderbeyla and Eyl, however, was the existence of a road to Garowe. The community in Eyl felt well connected to its state government, and overall seemed content with their situation. The Benderbeyla community, by contrast, was highly critical of a government they perceived as absent, not least because their local economy suffered as a result of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing off its coast. Finally, Galkayo was split in half by the border between Puntland and Galmudug. The conflict between Puntland and Galmudug over territorial control in Galkayo translated long-standing clan hostilities into fully-fledged political conflicts with standing armies.

As part of this baseline evaluation, the Wasafiri-Forcier team produced 17 individual district reports, and 1 combined report for North and South Galkayo, as well as the overall baseline report. The evaluation team presented findings on Federal Member State (FMS) capacity and legitimacy to an audience of select expert stakeholders.

SAMPLED DISTRICTS

PUNTLAND

GALUMUDUG

HIRSHABELLE

SOUTH WEST

JUBALAND

MATABAN
AFMADOW
BARDHERE
GARBAHARE
KISMAYO
BENDERBEYLA
BOSSASO
EYL
GALKAYO (NORTH)
BAIDOA
CEEL BARDE

ABUDWAQ
DHUSAMAREB
GALKAYO (SOUTH)
HOBYO
BELETWEYNE
JOWHAR
MAHADAY

The Wasafiri-Forcier team used purposive sampling to select the respondents of the evaluation, with each participant clearly defined in relation to their role and the constituency they represented. This was designed so that only respondents who were well versed with, or were beneficiaries of, the Fund's activities were selected, and to ensure representation of clans, both genders, and different age groups. The sampling method also allowed for continuity between different waves of data collection and replacement of a respondent should it become necessary, done by selecting eligible participants that fit the profile.

The following table details the type of key informants in each district. These groups were divided accordingly between relevant clans in each community.

KEY INFORMANT	NUMBER
Clan Elders	3
CBO/CSO Representatives	3
Youth Reps.	3
Women's Groups Reps.	3
Private Sector Reps.	3
District Admin Officials	3
TOTAL	18

An example of a community survey participant sample in four districts in Puntland is shown in the table below. Respondents were divided into four community segments, each with 15 respondents: older male community members, older female community members, young male community members, young female community members. The respondents, further, were selected based on their clan affiliation, using the district clan mapping, carried out at Baseline. Again, where possible, the respondents interviewed in previous phases of data collection will be contacted for re-interview.

STATE	DISTRICT	DOMINANT CLAN(S)	OTHER MAIN CLAN(S)	MINORITY CLAN/ OCCUPATIONAL MINORITY GROUPS	TOTAL
Puntland	Benderbeyla	24	20	16	60
	Galdogob	16	17	27	60
	Bossaso	26	13	21	60
	Galkayo North	24	16	20	60

SCORING APPROACH

In keeping with SSF's commitment to obtain stakeholder feedback on all its activities, the Wasafiri-Forcier team strongly recommended the use of a stakeholder scoring system to gauge beneficiary perception of SSF's contribution. Following review and approval of this methodology by FCDO (formerly DFID), the Fund formally adopted stakeholder scoring as the primary approach for indicator milestone tracking in SSF II. While stakeholder rating is not in itself an unreliable method, it can be unreliable and inconsistent if implemented without clear guidance and consideration for procedure. To ensure the method of stakeholder rating was more robust, three things were taken into consideration: i) scoring scale; ii) composition of the score and scoring methodology; and iii) stakeholder workshop.

I) SCORING SCALE

While examining the different approaches and scales for scoring, the Fund and the Wasafiri-Forcier team took into consideration three criteria for choosing the appropriate scale: reliability, validity, and discriminating power (i.e., ability to distinguish between categories). Given that the data to be summarised consisted primarily of qualitative perceptions data, a higher scale was determined to be better, as it provides more discriminatory power between categories. Research shows that higher scales, with around seven to ten response categories, are superior in terms of reliability, validity, and discriminating power. The seven-point scale is widely used and deemed the most reliable . It has a large backing within the M&E field, as research has found that it has the highest scores on reliability and inter-item consistency. Beyond seven response categories, little extra information is gained and discriminatory power decreases. A seven-point scale was therefore determined to be most appropriate for SSF's stakeholder rating, as it had enough categories to provide nuance yet not too many categories to lose meaningful difference between the options.

II) COMPOSITION OF THE SCORE AND SCORING METHODOLOGY

For each indicator, a desk review of the relevant literature was carried out to identify the underlying analytical concepts, which were then operationalised using the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria (e.g. quality and effectiveness). The construction of the scoring criteria was based on questions around these concepts (see Annexes 1 and 2).

Using Output Indicator 1.2 as an example, the next two tables indicate the definition, data collection methods, and questions that all informed scoring of the indicator.

TABLE 5: OUTPUT 1.2 INDICATOR AND CONCEPT DEFINITION

Indicator	Definition	Data Collection Method
Output 1.2: Quality and effectiveness between the district administration and the community.	This indicator was understood through the concepts of **involvement, shared priorities, stakeholder participation**, and **trust**. For involvement, survey respondents were asked questions relating to the visibility, engagement, transparency, and accessibility of the district administration. Questions on shared priorities related predominantly to the extent to which respondents felt the district administration prioritised the issues that were important to the respondent, while stakeholder participation sought to capture the extent to which people participated with government. Trust was measured through the respondents' confidence in government being able to follow through with any new programme they announced.	Survey with FGD participants. Responses converted to a score from 1 to 7.

As shown above, each concept had a clear definition of what it sought to measure. Indicator scoring was based on input mainly from focus group discussions (FGD) and questionnaires (QQ) (see Table 6 below). While key informant interview (KII) respondents were asked the same questions, their answers were excluded from the scoring, given that the key informants were in many cases directly linked to the district administration and represented a certain elite in the district. As such, their opinions would not represent a community opinion.

TABLE 6: OUTPUT INDICATOR 1.2 QUESTIONNAIRE

Component	Sub-Component	Tool	Questions
Involvement	Visibility	FGD QQ	How often does the district Aadministration hold public consultations with people in your community around development plans, security, or other community related issues?
	Openness (transparency)	FGD QQ	How open, or transparent, do you think the district administration is about its activities?
	Engagement	FGD QQ	How often are members of the district administration available to the public?
	Accessibility	FGD QQ	If you, or someone in your community, had an issue, how confident are you that you could voice this to your district administration?
Shared Priorities	Government and people have aligned priorities	FGD QQ	What are the biggest challenges that you face in your daily life? How important do you feel that these issues are to the district administration?
Stakeholder Participation	People participate on behalf of government	FGD QQ	How often, if at all, do you participate in public events organised by the district ddministration?
		FGD QQ	What are the reasons for you participating in these events?
		FGD QQ	What are the reasons for you NOT participating in these events?
Trust	Government keeps its word and delivers on commitments with integrity & honesty	FGD QQ	When the district administration announces a new programme, how confident are you that it will get implemented? Why are you confident/not confident in the district administration?

In order to produce the score, each answer was 'normalised', i.e., the answers were converted into a figure between 1 and 7 to have comparability across various questions and components. Scores indicated failing (1), poor (3), good (5), and excellent (7) performance. For example, the seven-point scale for the Output Indicator 1.2 component "Stakeholder Participation" is as below.

Score 7: All relevant sub-groups had the appropriate opportunity to participate in programme decisions and activities (dialogue, decision-making, and management).

- All relevant sub-groups consulted in programme design;
- All relevant sub-groups participated in programme activities.

Score 5: Most relevant sub-groups had the chance to participate in the programme decisions and activities.

- Most sub-groups were consulted, but did not feel adequately consulted in programme design and activities;
- Some sub-groups were partially excluded.

Score 3: Selected sub-groups participated in programme decisions and activities.

- Some sub-groups consulted in programme design, but the process was not inclusive of all relevant sub-groups;
- Some sub-groups participated more than others in programme activities.

Score 1: No groups consulted in programme design, and limited participation from sub-groups in activities.

- Programme design happened without consultation from relevant sub-groups;
- Limited participation from community in programme activities.

The components were scored by the researcher conducting the evaluation. All components for a particular indicator were then aggregated and the mean obtained in order to inform the indicator score. This scoring methodology developed by SSF and the Wasafiri-Forcier team for the baseline, and was subsequently used for the Fund's midline and endline evaluations, and in deep-dive case studies and evaluations for specific investments.

While the majority of Output Indicators and Outcome Indicators 2 and 3 were scored using the data from the FGDs and KIIs as described above, Outcome 4 was unique in the sense that data was presented at a stakeholder workshop, and the indicator was scored by experts. The Wasafiri-Forcier team convened stakeholder workshops in which a panel of experts on Somalia provided scores based on a presentation of results from studies conducted in the year. These included state-level scenarios produced by Sahan Research that looked at key fault line issues across Somalia, specific to each state, and how the status of those conflicts had declined, remained constant, or improved. Other studies used as the basis for stakeholder workshop scoring included midline and endline evaluations of specific investments, secondary context analysis reports, and deep-dive case studies. Stakeholders would rank the concepts developed for the indicator (such as quality, relevance, effectiveness, etc.) using the seven-point scale and based on the findings from these studies.

III) STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP

Due to practical considerations, stakeholder and expert meetings were organised at the national level where district representatives were asked to rate the various aspects of activity in their respective districts. The indicator was broken into various questions and scores that were aggregated first for each of the district representatives. The district score was a simple mean of all district representatives' scores. District and state performance was scored separately as there were processes that were exclusive to the state level, and as such the state score could not be assumed to be just an aggregation of the district scores. For example, it is possible that women were involved better at the state level; scoring only at district level and aggregating to form the state score would lose this detail.

The composition of stakeholders for the workshop included community-based organisation (CBO) representatives, private sector representatives, clan elders, youth representatives, and women's representatives. The stakeholders scored the indicator independently, based on a presentation of the results from the research conducted by Wasifiri-Forcier and other firms, as well as their own expertise. Where available, stakeholders were asked to substantiate their rating with evidence from FGDs and KIIs.

In keeping with the same methodology as the Year 1 baseline, the Fund held two subsequent stakeholder/expert workshops in October 2018 and October 2019 where experts scored the relevant indicators at Outcome and, with time, Output level.

LIMITATIONS & CHALLENGES

Several limitations and challenges emerged during the baseline evaluation which are important to note, and which had implications on the ability to extrapolate findings:

Number of clans. The baseline only had the bandwidth to sample from three clan groups. Consequently, clans were grouped together based on their relationship to political power in the district, i.e., whether they were a big clan controlling the district, a big clan not in control of the district or otherwise secondary in power, or a minority clan. Careful inferences of clans that fall outside of the sample were made when it was justified with the data, and when it was possible to make the argument that their situation is very similar to one of the sampled clans.

Purposive sampling. The sample for the FGDs was based on ensuring the representation of clans, both genders, and different age groups. As such, the quantitative data was not a result of random sampling. However, the plan was to conduct the midline and endline focus group discussions, KIIs, and surveys with the same respondents, allowing for the detection of change over time.

Unitary actor assumption. The assumption of the unity of the clan could be problematic, in particular as it relates to Outcome 2 analysis where the research aimed to capture the attitudes of a clan towards the government or other actors. For example, the youth and the elders often had different opinions, or many of the clan members had sympathies towards another actor but the clan leadership had a different position. Where possible these differences were made explicit.

The limits of district control. Despite the baseline aiming to capture the reality of a district, in some cases the research was limited to the district capital due to the boundaries of effective political control. This related particularly to the districts where Al-Shabab was in close proximity, e.g. Afgoye, Kismayo, Bardhere, and Mahaday.

Securitised environments. Many of the districts in the sample were in a "peace through strength" situation, where very harsh measures were sometimes taken to protect the area. In various cases, people were visibly cautious and unwilling to voice opinions that may come across as critical. Where detected, this was always made explicit in the reporting.

Power relations in focus groups. While the FGDs were separated by gender and age, they were of mixed clan composition. On the one hand, this ensured diversity of opinion, while on the other, it was possible that members of minority clans were much more reserved in voicing their opinions in such a setting—particularly if it contradicted the majority opinion. Nevertheless, this proved to be a very interesting and useful analytical point of focus, as it allowed the difference to be seen between private and public opinion, namely what people say in the FGD and what they say privately when surveyed.

Conflict intensity measure. The intensity of conflict was measured through the ACLED dataset numbers. These numbers were not restricted to communal conflict but included political violence and campaigns between Al-Shabab and other actors; they were not directly a measure of communal conflict as such. However, to differentiate between different types of events was near impossible as oftentimes the events were not well categorised or not all details were available. Moreover, there was the possibility that in many cases, clan conflict was characterised as conflict between Al-Shabab and another actor, and oftentimes the overlap was apparent. As such, while not a perfect measure, the ACLED data allowed for consistency over time (as their coding remained the same). However, it should be seen as a measure of overall intensity of conflict in each location rather than that of communal conflict per se.

MIDLINE

SSF engaged the Wasafiri-Forcier consortium to conduct a midline evaluation in July 2018. This aimed to capture the current status of each area of interest in target locations in order to inform programming and to identify any changes that had taken place in the reporting period.

Alongside the main midline evaluation, three in-depth case studies were conducted with the aim of assessing the quality, relevance, and effectiveness of select SSF-funded interventions. The three case studies were carried out on: the Wadajir Framework support in Galmudug (Hobyo, Abudwaq, and Balanbale); the Stabilisation investment by the Nordic International Support (NIS) Foundation in Bardhere; and three investments in Galkayo that included two youth centres and the Resolving Conflict in Galkayo investment.

Research was carried out across 21 districts in the 5 FMSs in the form of focus group discussions, questionnaires with participants, and key informant interviews with stakeholders at both district and state level. 2 new districts (Balanbale and Xudur) were added to the sample used for the baseline, while 3 districts (Warsheikh, Galdogob, and Barawe) replaced 3 initially sampled for the baseline (Mataban, Eyl, and Afgoye, respectively).

As in the baseline, findings were presented to an audience of selected expert stakeholders who were asked to provide a numeric score for each indicator using the approach established in the baseline. Comparisons between baseline and midline were presented, with the inclusion of only those districts that overlapped between baseline and midline, in order to ensure that the analysis compared like with like. The Wasafiri-Forcier team produced in-depth reports for each FMS, three case study reports, and an overall midline report.

LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES

While many of the limitations and challenges in the baseline evaluation remained for the midline, more emerged that had an implication on analysis and extrapolation of findings:

District changes between baseline and midline. Between baseline and midline, the Fund had come to the conclusion that it was unlikely that there would be programming in some of the districts that were part of the initial research sample. Given that the initial sample was not a random selection of districts in the FMSs, it was decided that these districts would be replaced with ones where SSF was supporting activities, to allow

for tracking changes over time going into endline. The changes were kept to a maximum of one per state, to ensure that there were sufficient comparison points between baseline and midline in each state. For the midline, therefore, the score only contained the scores for those districts that overlapped between different waves of data collection.

Understanding of conflict. With power-sharing agreements determined on a clan-basis (i.e. consensus on sharing of power by different clans, with slots distributed to each clan based on an agreed formula), scarcity of resources, and a recent history of intense inter-clan fighting, Somalia was rife with communal tensions directly and indirectly, and not at all linked to power-sharing agreements. It was therefore important to distinguish between simmering or currently-emerging tensions between clans, recurring or ongoing disputes, and armed violence that was—or threatened to become—protracted. The analysis considered as conflict: hostilities that included armed violence; disputes as issue-related disagreements that involved group support on both sides; and tensions as animosities between groups that were yet to link overtly to concrete issues or turn violent. As an additional issue, respondents were often quick to classify a conflict as resolved if there had not been violent incidents for a short period of time.

Quantifying complex phenomenon. The measurement of 'inter-communal conflicts' and 'legitimacy' presented a challenge. In these cases, the most suitable proxies were chosen — such as 'intensity', which formed part of the score for Outcome 2, based on data from the ACLED dataset. Yet, as it captured casualties and incidents, most of which were perpetrated by Al-Shabab across Somalia, it did not necessarily correspond to the intensity of inter-communal conflicts and, fundamentally, to their relationship towards the government. It was therefore cautioned that all scores be read alongside other scores, as well as the qualitative data presented.

ENDLINE

For the 2020 endline evaluation, the scoring methodology was slightly adjusted due to the restrictions posed by C-19. Rather than convene an in-person experts' workshop to validate the scores, the Fund used either one of the following methods throughout:

Commissioned the Wasafiri-Forcier consortium and other research firms to conduct evaluations, review the data, and provide an endline score[2] (see Table 5 below); or

Commissioned an independent consultant and a local consultant with expertise in contextual knowledge to review the relevant SSF quarterly analysis and secondary context analysis (replacing the Sahan bi-annual state-level scenarios) and consolidate the findings in a capping report. The consultants then facilitated a virtual presentation and workshop of the summary findings to experts who then scored the indicator[3].

TABLE 7: FIRMS COMMISSIONED BY SSF TO CONDUCT ENDLINE EVALUATIONS IN 2020

Research Firm	Indicator	Assignment
Wasafiri-Consilient	Outcome 2	Endline evaluations in the same 21 districts as the midline
	Outcome 4	
	Output 3.2	
	Output 3.3	
Horn Africa Consultants Firm (HACOF)	Output 1.1	Endline evaluation of Galkayo Peace Initiative investment
		Endline evaluation of the Sool and Sanaag Community-Driven Development (CDD) investment
Researchcare	Output 2.1	5 endline evaluations of GESI investments (one in each of the five states)
Consilient	Output 4.1	3 endline evaluations of Wadajir Framework investments in Galmudug

The 2020 measurements of these projects were comparable to the baseline and midline scores for applicable districts and investments.

LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES

The majority of the study limitations in the baseline and midline held constant in the endline, with the addition of one unique challenge: COVID-19. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in Somalia not only affected the logistical considerations for the endline research, but also shaped the discussions held with endline respondents. Many respondents were preoccupied with the economic impact of restrictions associated with the virus during interviews, oftentimes skewing the narratives provided.

Image credit: @SSF

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CASE STUDY: LEVERAGING FINTECH TO DRIVE COMMUNITY-OWNED DEVELOPMENT IN SOMALIA

The Somalia Stability Fund set up a dialogue programme to incentivise community-government collaboration around resource mobilisation, to invest in community-funded infrastructure projects in the region of Gedo, Jubaland. As part of this work, SSF (through its investee DRC) established Sokaab, a fintech platform which allows communities to set up fundraising campaigns for local investments online. Under a system of matching funds, the programme contributed an agreed amount in line with community funding, and SSF adjusted the amount of matching funds to incentivise higher levels of inter-communal collaboration.

The transparency of this fundraising approach critically demonstrated openness and fostered community support and engagement in a context of low levels of trust in government/institutions, and high levels of corruption. In addition, the clear 'rules of the game' helped to overcome accusations of clan-bias, something that is often common in donor-funding in Somalia. The simple and effective platform not only increased community trust, but also empowered communities to make their own decisions and drive their own priorities - ensuring delivery of locally-owned initiatives, and reducing dependence on donor funding. To date the programme has received +$1.8m in donations from approximately 8,000 different backers, and has also expanded to other regions, delivering across 55 projects in Somalia to date.

INVESTEE MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND LEARNING SUPPORT

While portfolio-level data was collected primarily by the Wasafiri-Forcier consortium, SSF relied upon investees to collect information for the quantitative indicators in the results framework, e.g. Year 3 Output 2.2 (Total number of women, youth, and minorities supported by SSF to improve their participation in governance), and Output 3.1 (Total number of men and women who have benefitted from socio-economic opportunities in partnership with government). SSF developed tools to facilitate the collection of data relevant to these indicators and provided periodic training to investment managers and investees, where applicable, on the use of new tools. SSF also assisted investment managers and investees in the collection of activity verification and anecdotal information to be gathered throughout the investment lifecycle.

INVESTMENT-LEVEL SUPPORT

For investment-level data, each investment partner was required to develop a unique log-frame, produced in coordination with investment managers and the Fund's M&E team, to ensure that outputs and outcomes at the investment-level contributed to one or more of the four wider SSF outputs. Investees were then expected to collect data related to the investment-level indicators and report on progress made against targets via their quarterly progress reports. These reports also provided analysis on how investment-level output indicators contributed to the expected outcomes of the project, as well as the correlation between the investment-level outputs and outcomes and the portfolio-level (results framework) outputs. The detailed quarterly progress reports facilitated discussions at both the investment and portfolio levels on what was working and what was not, and where modifications or new solutions were needed to ensure that investments were actively contributing to the SSF outcome.

SSF held bi-annual investee workshops to ensure that partners were provided with the capacity and tools to meet the Fund's M&E and reporting expectations. SSF used this opportunity to train and refocus investees on the importance of consistent data collection and reporting to the M&E and learning processes. The workshops also provided a forum for the sharing of experiences and lessons learned across investments so that partners could benefit from each other's successes, challenges, and strategies for overcoming obstacles.

LEARNING WORKSHOPS

Towards the end of SSF II in September 2020, SSF held six two-day learning workshops with its investees, meantwith the aim ofto generateconsolidating lessons learned from phase IItwo of SSF investments implemented between 2016 and 2020. As with past workshops, these end-of-phase-II investee workshops provided participants with an opportunity to share their perspectives on the successes, challenges, and opportunities in stabilizisation programming, afterfollowing aboutroughly three years of implementation in the complex and fluid environment of Somalia.

The six workshops were held remotely due to travel restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. A workshop was devoted to each of the five 5 FMSs: - Jubaland, South West State, Hirshabelle, Galmudug, and Puntland. The sixth workshop focused on national- level investments. Each workshop typically involved 10-15 representatives from implementing partners, reflecting on experiences of five to eight SSF investments in each FMS. The workshop discussions were organised around eight 8 pre-set questions used to guide the discussions, but the format allowding the facilitators flexibility to pursue promising observations and insights from the investees that were not anticipated in the pre-set questions.

The pre-set questions were:

1. What evidence is there that the interventions contributed to enhancing state legitimacy and reducing political and communal conflict? Any unintended or unexpected effects?

2. Which types of interventions have been more successful or less successful in contributing to the achievement of stability in the state, and why? I.e., was it easier to achieve results in some areas than others? Which interventions were more effective and why?

3. What factors contributed to the achievements of the interventions?

4. What factors inhibited the achievements?

5. Did the assumptions about the context remain valid, or do the assumptions need adapting and refining in the future? Were the influencing factors in the region properly identified?

6. What evidence is there that the changes contributed by the interventions will be sustainable?

7. How can the intervention be made more relevant to the complex challenging local and state needs? I.e., social, economic, political factors?

8. How can the design of the interventions be improved to promote state stability, reduce political and communal conflict, and deal with the constraints in the state?

The resultant discussions, findings, and key lessons from investees' experiences and observations are captured in the 2020 SSF Lesson Learning Paper (see Annex 3). However, the value and limitation to the type of evidence generated by such workshops is worth noting here. The principal value of the exercise is the rich, granular observations shared by investees, whose close on-the-ground experience gave them unique insights into socio-cultural contextual factors, political economy dynamics, government capacity constraints, security risks, and other factors shaping investment outcomes. The workshop format also gave priority to Somali voices and perspectives in the exercise.

Nevertheless, one of the limitations to this approach has to do with the reliability of the evidence collected. Individual perceptions of program impact are, by definition, subjective. To the extent that both investee and SSF teams were stakeholders in the investments, bias toward favourable interpretations of impact is a risk. The fractious nature of contemporary Somali politics also carries a risk as some investees might decline to speak frankly about local context for fear of retaliation.

A bigger, structural limitation to this type of exercise is the difficulty of inferring causal impact of investments on desired outcomes, whether intermediary objectives or the ultimate objective of enhancing state stability. Trends in state stability in any setting are impacted by many other variables over which investees have little control. Both a positive or negative correlation between an investment and, say, reduced political conflict could be spurious – the result of an extraneous factor. Indeed, multi-causality is a ubiquitous problem in impact assessment of all forms of social and political interventions. Investees' close contextual knowledge nevertheless gave them strong insights into the impact some other factors had on trends in state stability.

PERIODIC REVISION TO THE RESULTS FRAMEWORK

In line with SSF's conceptual framework and Theory of Change, the M&E framework was a tool to learn from the implementation of investments and inform decision-making, with the aim being to keep adapting and improving based on emergent learning. Monitoring focused on understanding how and why investments influenced the change SSF desired, and compared what was observed to the baseline. This resulted in periodic review and subsequent evolution of the SSF's conceptual framework, all of which was presented to and approved by FCDO prior to operationalisation.

Some of the key changes over the years include:

- Due to value-for-money considerations in 2019, SSF did not collect communal-level data for Outcome Indicator 2 and 4. Instead, SSF used the ACLED data and the Sahan monthly and quarterly reports to produce FMS-level scores and an aggregate score. A panel of experts then assigned the Status of Communal Conflict score (Indicator 2). For Indicator 3, experts were asked to score Government Legitimacy based on presentations on the performance of each state by SSF's policy advisors and the SSF team.

By the end of phase II, SSF had settled on the two key objectives articulated in the following table.

TABLE 8: SSF II YEAR 4 OUTCOMES

Outcome	Indicators
SSF will contribute to enhanced government legitimacy and reduced political and communal conflict	◆ Status of communal conflicts ◆ Status of political conflicts ◆ Government legitimacy
Ultimately leading to the overall goal of enhancing stability in Somalia	◆ Somalia's scoring under the Fragile States Index

- Similarly, SSF did not collect communal-level data in the 21 sampled districts for applicable Output 3 indicators. Instead, the Fund generated qualitative data from case studies covering these outputs. These case studies included: 1) The DRC DIALOGUE project; 2) Support to the Wadajir framework in Balanbale, Hobyo, and Abudwaq; 3) Stabilisation intervention in Bulo Burto; 4) Warsheikh solar electrification project; 5) Investment in youth and private sector development in Afmadow and Bardhere; and 6) Economic development initiatives in Kismayo, Raskamboni, and Garbahare.

- The 2018 annual review of SSF II recommended that Output 2.2 (Total number of women, youth, and minorities supported by SSF to improve their participation in governance) be no longer tracked. As such, target and actual figures were removed for 2019 and 2020.

- The 2018 SSF II annual review also recommended that Output 3.1 (Total number of men and women who have benefitted from socio-economic opportunities in partnership with government) be no longer disaggregated by gender. The target and actual figures were adjusted accordingly.

The Fund had further identified the following output-level objectives as the focus of its delivery:

TABLE 9: SSF II YEAR 4 OUTPUTS

Output	Indicators
Address fault lines for political conflict based on priorities identified in the macro-analysis	◆ Quality, relevance, and effectiveness of SSF-delivered work contributing to addressing identified fault lines
Enhance popular voice and participation, particularly for women and excluded groups	◆ Quality, relevance, and effectiveness of SSF-delivered work to increase popular participation in formal and informal governance structures
Increase government visibility and community engagement around key priorities such as services and livelihoods	◆ Total number of people who have benefitted from socio-economic opportunities in partnership with government (i.e., district, FMS, and FGS) ◆ Quality of engagement between the FMS and targeted communities ◆ Quality of engagement between district administrations and targeted communities
Reduce community vulnerability to conflict through targeted conflict resolution approaches	Quality, relevance, and effectiveness of SSF interventions aimed at de-risking or de-escalating conflicts

The revisions to SSF's Outputs and Outcomes represented a shift to the Fund's programme logic as outlined below:

- They presupposed that addressing the political fault lines for contestation and conflict identified in SSF's Analysis should be at the centre of any strategy to build stability in Somalia

- They recognised that:

  As an external actor, SSF must be realistic about its scope to influence underlying power structures, with results heavily dependent on political will and the incentives of key elites

  Success depends on SSF developing the right analysis and using this to influence others and shape the broader stability agenda through a common approach, which involved advocacy and, in some cases, mediation work by actors such as UNSOM and IGAD. This aligns with Principle V on Coalition-building

- They encouraged SSF to support enhanced popular participation, particularly for women and excluded groups (Output 2), in order to promote broader voice, empowerment, and accountability in the long–term, and avoid exclusion of these groups that could lead to longer-term instability

- They shaped SSF's support to women and excluded groups to increase their voice and agency (and ultimately their impact on policy outcomes), leading to enhanced government legitimacy

- They drove SSF's delivery of interventions, which increased government visibility and community engagement around key priorities such as services and livelihood opportunities

- They informed SSF's targeted support to conflict resolution processes, working in partnership with the state authorities where possible as the best way of ensuring sustainability, alongside informing SSF's activities to address localised conflict drivers and reduce incentives for conflict. This reduced community vulnerability to conflict and contributed to enhanced government legitimacy, and a reduction in the incidence of violent conflict at the community level.

The table below shows the various indicator targets and actual scores over the SSF II implementation period.

Table 10: SSF II Indicator Scores

Indicator	Baseline 2017	Milestone 2017	Actual 2017	Milestone 2018	Actual 2018		Target 2019	Actual 2019	Target 2020	Actual 2020	Target/Narrative Milestone 2021	Actual 2021
Indicator 1: Somalia's scoring under the Fragile States Index.		113	113	113	113.2		113	112.3	113	110.9	113	
Indicator 2: Status of communal conflicts.	5.4	n/a	n/a	No regression	5.6		5	4.3	5	5.5	Positive and demonstrable evidence that the WF process contributed to reduction in communal conflict.	
Indicator 3: Status of political conflicts.	3	n/a	n/a	No regression	3.55		3	2.99	3	3.75	n/a (discontinued in 2021)	
Indicator 4: Government legitimacy.	3.6	n/a	n/a	No regression	3.4		3.6	3.9	3.6	3.8	Whether large infrastructure investments and support to democratisation processes are effective at promoting government legitimacy (and why/why not) is assessed.	
1.1: Quality, relevance and effectiveness of SSF-delivered work contributing to addressing identified fault-lines.	n/a	n/a	n/a	5	5.2		5	5.3	5	6.1	n/a (discontinued in 2021)	
1.1: Relevance and outreach of policy engagement to address political conflict fault-lines.	n/a (added in 2021)										Faultline assessments, political conflict risk assessments and hotspot analysis produced, periodically peer-reviewed and deemed relevant throughout the development process.	
2.1: Quality, relevance and effectiveness of SSF-delivered work to increase popular participation in formal and informal governance structures.	0	n/a	n/a	5	4.9		5	5.2	5	5.6	n/a (revised in 2021)	
2.2: Total number of women, youth and minorities supported by SSF to improve their participation in governance.	Women: 0	100	138	230	316		n/a (discontinued in 2019)					
	Men: 0	50	80	115	349							
2.1: Relevance and appropriateness of SSF-delivered work to increase popular participation in formal governance structures at FMS level.	n/a (revised in 2021)										Subnational democratisation support to electoral agencies and relevant state ministries in target locations is perceived as relevant and appropriate by recipient stakeholders.	
3.1: Total number of men and women who have benefitted from socio-economic opportunities in partnership with government (i.e. district, FMS, and FGS).	Women: 0	150,000	164,011	374,011	502,964		2,948, 022	2,959,830	3,661,032	3,982,053	n/a (discontinued in 2021)	
	Men: 0	150,000	164,011	374,011	502,964							
3.2: Quality of engagement between the FMS and targeted communities.	3.9	n/a	n/a	No regression	4.3		4.5	4.9	4.5	3.9	n/a (discontinued in 2021)	
3.3: Quality of engagement between district administrations and targeted communities.	4.8	6	n/a	No regression	4.7		4.5	4.5	4.5	4.8	Positive and demonstrable evidence of improved quality of engagement between district administrations and communities.	
4.1: Quality, relevance and effectiveness of SSF interventions aimed at de-risking or de-escalating conflicts.	n/a	n/a	n/a	5	5.5		5	5.6	5	5	n/a (discontinued in 2021)	
4.1: Relevance and outreach of research on reconciliation, democratisation and governance.	n/a (added in 2021)										Research and communication pieces produced and periodically peer-reviewed for relevance and potential usefulness throughout the development process.	

LOCAL OWNERSHIP

SSF II EXTENSION APPROACH (2021)

In late 2020, SSF was extended for a year to December 2021. The extension presented an opportunity to update and refresh the Fund's strategy, and the Fund Manager was requested to respond to a revised Terms of Reference by its donors. Over the 2021 period, SSF has taken a two-pronged approach to delivery, capitalising on the successes of the existing pipeline, whilst reorienting towards a more structured long-term approach to stability. The two aspects of the approach were as follows:

- Delivering on previously-agreed investments within the existing SSF pipeline, which have already been discussed with Somali counterparts; and

- Shifting SSF towards a 'workstream' approach to develop a set of focused and closely connected investments that address underlying long-term stability challenges.

The workstream approach enabled SSF to continue delivering against the existing outputs whilst responding to new priority areas. SSF addressed instability by working specifically on: state-level democratisation, implementation of the Wadajir Framework, reconciliation, and key cross-cutting research.

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SSF II EXTENSION (2021) M&E FRAMEWORK

The revisions to the M&E Framework were driven by: SSF's strategic changes to the SSF work plan in its extension period; the changing context in Somalia; and the findings of the Fund's endline surveys, progress report, and annual review findings. An additional influencing factor driving the revision to the SSF RF were the challenges identified by past M&E methodologies. The revision sought to establish: the use of robust sampling procedures for data collection from representational stakeholder populations; the cost-efficient design of surveys and case studies to gather data to track attribution and/or contribution of results; and robust analysis of performance against the selected criteria from the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria.

In line with this, SSF adjusted the results framework at the level of most output indicator statements, definitions, and Means of Verification (MoV). Certain indicators were discontinued as they were not relevant to the revised strategic focus. Given the extension, new targets were included for 2021 at both the outcome and output levels. SSF took on board FCDO advice to move away from quantitative targets and instead use narrative milestones, which are easier to understand and can capture, with more nuance, the role the programme has played against each objective. Because of this shift, the setting of targets to measure progress in 2021 is not connected to the targets for previous years, and comparative analysis is neither relevant nor possible.

For the extension period, SSF's Outcome objectives remained the same although one Outcome Indicator - Status of Political Conflicts - was discontinued. The Output objectives and Indicators were revised to those in the table below.

TABLE 11: SSF II EXTENSION OUTPUTS

Output	Indicators
Fault lines for political conflict (FGS-FMS, inter-state, & intra-state) are identified and appropriately addressed	Relevance and outreach of policy engagement to address political conflict fault lines
Enhance popular participation in FMS governance	Relevance and appropriateness of SSF-delivered work to increase popular participation in formal governance structures at FMS level
Increased government visibility and community engagement	Quality of engagement between district administrations and targeted communities
Research, communications, and knowledge brokering on issues of democratisation, local governance, and reconciliation	Relevance and outreach of research on reconciliation, democratisation, and governance

The review and revision process featured a series of internal workshops, with SSF Programme and M&E team members assessing how the revised strategy would fit with the overarching Theory of Change. Contextual and programmatic risks and assumptions were revisited and revised throughout the results framework.

The SSF results framework continues operating according to problem-driven iterative and adaptive principles by implementing flexible programme that adapts to emerging learning and to an evolving and dynamic context to increase government legitimacy and reduce political and communal conflict in Somalia.

SUMMARY OF KEY LESSONS

In addition to the various lessons mentioned throughout this report, some of the Fund's key learnings on M&E over the years include:

• The need to regularly revisit assumptions, as some may no longer hold with time. The result of assumptions not holding is reduced effectiveness of the Fund's investments in achieving the overall outcome, thereby requiring that target scores at outcome and output levels are adjusted to make more realistic in evolving contexts.

• The initial results framework structure was over-complicated and did not give a clear picture of the progress that the fund had achieved. There is value in a simplified logframe that ensures that the indicators, milestones and analytical framework are more intuitive.

• There is need to invest time and other resources in M&E to ensure systems and skills are integrated throughout the SSF delivery chain at both portfolio and investment levels, helping strengthen the links between the portfolio and investment outcomes and bridge the gap between activities and their impact.

• There is value in developing standard Key Performance Indicators and indicator definitions across similar investments to enable analysis of results across investments, geographic locations, partners, etc.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: SSF II OUTPUT SCORING FORMS

At output level, investments were evaluated against their quality, relevance, and effectiveness, operationalised using the OECD DAC criteria—with some additional input on the quality component—and tailored towards community perspectives. The three criteria were further broken down into sub-components (see graph below). These sub-components were scored by the researcher conducting the evaluation. Each sub-component was then aggregated to form the component score. Scoring was based on input mainly from KIIs, as well as focus group discussions (FGDs) and questionnaires (QQs) conducted ahead of these. The FGD QQ focused on relevance, where a community perspective element was included.

The figure below shows the evaluation criteria and their sub-components.

QUALITY, RELEVENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERVENTION

QUALITY
- Contributing factors
- Sustainability
- Alignment of objectives

RELEVENCE
- Alignment of priorities
- Conistency with overall goal and objectives

EFFECTIVENESS
- Responsiveness
- Stakeholder participation
- Exernalities and conflict/ gender sensitivity

QUALITY

RESPONSIVENESS

7	7. Intervention was fully responsive and adaptive in the face of challenges (defined based on indicator or investment)	Evidence of effective response in the face of challenges posed to intervention
		Evidence of revision of strategy based on change of circumstances
		Evidence of continual monitoring of relevance of program objectives
5	5. Intervention was partly responsive and exhibits some adaptability	Some evidence of response in the face of challenges
		Evidence of consideration of revision of strategy based on changing circumstances
		Identification of relevance of program objectives using sound evidence, but not continually monitored
3	3. Intervention was not responsive in the face of challenges, although these were identified	No effective response in face of challenges
		However, challenges were identified by mechanisms
		Relevance of program objectives were justified before intervention, but not monitored
1	1. Intervention is not responsive	No effective response mechanism for dealing with challenges
		No justification for relevance of program objectives

STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION

7	7. All relevant sub-groups had the appropriate opportunity to participate in programme decisions and activities (dialogue, decision-making, and management)	All relevant sub-groups consulted in programme design
		All relevant sub-groups participated in programme activities 5. Most relevant sub-groups had the chance to participate in the programme decisions and activities
		Most sub-groups were consulted, but did not feel adequately consulted in programme design and activities
		Some sub-groups were partially excluded
3	3. Selected sub-groups participated in programme decisions and activities	Some sub-groups consulted in programme design, but the process was not inclusive of all relevant sub-groups
		Some sub-groups participate more than others in programme activities
1	1. No groups consulted in programme design, and limited participation from sub-groups in activities	Programme design happened without consultation from relevant sub-groups
		Limited participation from community in programme activities

STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION

N/A	Not to be scored — instead flesh out any externalities or conflict sensitivities that had significant impact on the project as contextual information.	

RELEVANCE

ALIGNMENT OF PRIORITIES

7	Priorities of community are aligned with programme objectives	Programme objectives are directly aligned with the needs of the target community
		Community leaders and all community members agree that these are the most relevant priorities
5	Priorities of community are somewhat aligned with programme objectives	Most community leaders and community members agree objectives are in line with community priorities
		Some members of the community raise other concerns as more salient
3	Priorities of community are not very aligned with programme objectives	Most of community leaders and community members disagree objectives are in line with community priorities
		Several members of the community raise concerns over relevance, and other priorities are emphasised
1	Priorities of community are not at all aligned with programme objectives	All community leaders and community members agree that objectives of programme are not at all aligned with their priorities

CONSISTENCY WITH OVERALL GOAL AND OBJECTIVES (ALIGNMENT WITH SSF STRATEGY, GESI STRATEGY AND LOG FRAME OBJECTIVES)

7	7. Overall goals and objectives are consistent with log frame targets	Programme delivery is fully in line with wider objectives of programme
		All stakeholders are fully aware and clear on the objectives across programme
		There is full consistency across the programme in terms of the objectives it is seeking to deliver
5	Goals and objectives are somewhat consistent with log frame targets	Programme delivery is partly in line with objectives of programme
		Most stakeholders are aware and can communicate the overall goals and objectives
		There is consistency across the programme in terms of objectives it is seeking to deliver
3	Goals and objectives are not very consistent with log frame targets	Programme delivery is not very in line with objectives of programme
		Most stakeholders are not aware of objectives of programme
		There is not a lot of consistency across the programme in terms of objectives
1	Goals and objectives are not at all consistent with log frame targets	Programme delivery is not at all in line with objectives
		There is little, if any, awareness of objectives across programme
		No consistency across programme in terms of objectives

EFFECTIVENESS

ATTAINMENT OF OBJECTIVES		
7	7. All objectives are fully obtained, or likely to be obtained	The programme has been fully responsive to changes in the context of the investment
		The programme has achieved its stated objectives
		Target groups have been reached
		The project has achieved milestones in a timely manner
5	5. Objectives are somewhat obtained, or likely to be obtained	The programme has been somewhat responsive to changes in the context
		The programme has somewhat achieved its stated objectives
		Target groups have been reached, but some have been left out
		There have been some minor delays in achieving milestones
3	3. Objectives are only partially obtained, or are not likely to be obtained	The programme is unresponsive to change
		Objectives have only partially been achieved
		Only few communities have been reached
		Milestones have faced significant delays
4	4. Objectives have not been, or are very unlikely to be, obtained	The programme is highly unresponsive to change
		Objectives have not been achieved
		None of the target groups have been reached
		No milestones have been reached
SUSTAINABILITY		
7	7. The project is fully sustainable	High level of community ownership
		Clear plan for the long-term of the project, with everyone on board
		Programme has continued resources to sustain itself, and does not require external support (financial or otherwise) to sustain itself
5	5. The programme is somewhat sustainable	Some evidence of community ownership
		Some plan for the long-term of the project
		Some evidence of resource availability for the project
6	6. The programme is partially sustainable	Little community ownership
		No plan for the long-term of the project
		Little evidence of resources for project, none committed
7	7. The programme is not at all sustainable	No ownership by community
		No plan for the long-term of the project
		No resources available or committed to continuity of project
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS		
N/A	Not to be scored — instead flesh out major factors influencing success and major challenges to achieving the project's objectives as contextual information.	

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FGS AND FMS

7	Parliament and the executive at the FGS level function optimally. State building process co-owned and co-managed by the centre and peripheries, and no FMS opts out of the state building process. Negotiated roadmap on the completion of key transitional tasks and on the security governance architecture and policies is agreed upon and implementationis in progress.
6	Parliament and the executive at the FGS level function reasonably well with some tensions, but mitigated with dialogue. State building process largely co-owned and co-managed by the centre and peripheries, and no FMS opts out of the state building process. Negotiated roadmap on the completion of some transitional tasks and on the security governance architecture and policies is agreed upon but implementation is yet to begin.
5	Parliament and the executive at the FGS level swings between confrontation and collaboration. State building process managed by the centre and peripheries with some tension and perceptions of inequality, but no FMS opts out of the state building process. Roadmap on the completion of key transitional tasks captured in political roadmap and on the security governance architecture and policies is under negotiation.
4	No deterioration in state building, but limited progress in negotiating the roadmap on the completion of key transitional tasks captured in political roadmap and/or security governance. Parliament and the executive at the FGS level function minimally.
3	Inadequate leadership from FGS as intra and inter-friction between the presidency, parliament, and FMS lead to inertia. No progress is made in negotiating the roadmap on completion of the Federalism process and/or security governance for the last 6 months of the year under review. Although authenticity of governance structures remains intact, at least 1 FMS threatens (formally or informally) to pull out of the state building process.
2	Parliament and the executive at the FGS level fail to function due to conflict over the management of Somalia's transition. Federalism process halted; although authenticity of governance structures remains intact, 1 FMS pulls out of the state building process.
1	The centre does not hold and peripheries fracture. National and state institutions paralysed by political conflict. Withdrawal of at least 2 FMSs from the state building process and collapse of the FGS.

INTER AND INTRA-STATE POLITICAL CONFLICT

(inter will include issues between Somalia and Somaliland but intra will not include Somaliland)

7	There is no friction between FMSs over the control and management of territory, border, or transnational communities. Administrations within all of the FMSs are representative and accepted by all of the communities within the FMSs, including trans-state communities.
6	There is no notable dispute between FMSs over control and management of territory or border or transnational communities; administrations within 5 of the FMSs are largely representative and broadly accepted by most of the communities within the FMSs.
5	There is sporadic political friction between 2-3 FMSs over the control and management of territory, border, or transnational communities. Administrations within 5 FMSs are reasonably representative and broadly accepted by dominant communities within the FMSs, but there is limited acceptance from less influential or trans-state communities.
4	There are regular tensions between 2-3 FMSs over the control and management of territory, border, or transnational communities but no violent clashes occur during the year in question, or clashes are isolated incidents. Administrations within 4 FMSs are accepted by most of the dominant communities but there is limited acceptance from less influential or trans-state communities.
3	Sporadic violent clashes flare up between 2 FMSs over the control and management of territory, border, or transnational communities. In 1-2 states a small number of communities openly oppose the state administration and vocally express their desire for leadership change.
2	Regular violent clashes flare up between and/or within 3-4 FMSs over the control and management of territory, border, or transnational communities, leading to conflict and instability in those areas. In at least 3 states a number of communities openly oppose the state administration and vocally express their desire for leadership change. And/or in 1-2 states a number of communities openly disengage from the state administration.
1	Continuous violent clashes between and/or within all FMSs over the control and management of territory, border, or people lead to conflict and instability throughout Somalia.

ANNEX 3: 2021 RESULTS FRAMEWORK

ANNEX 4A/B: LIST OF INVESTMENTS

ENDNOTES

1   These figures are for the full fund value and include the Fund Manager fees and expenses.

2   For Outcome Indicators 2 & 4, and Output Indicators 1.1, 2.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 4.1.

3   For Outcome Indicator 3.

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