




LESSONS LEARNT AND PROSPECTS FOR COHERENCE
WITH POLICING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT

DURABLE LOCAL RECONCILIATION



DURABLE LOCAL RECONCILIATION - NOVEMBER 2021

IMPLEMENTED BY ADAM SMITH INTERNATIONAL

DELIVERING PEACE & STABILITY IN SOMALIA



'A STRING IS NEEDED TO
GATHER SCATTERED BEADS'

SOMALI PROVERB

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

KEY FINDINGS:

- Most violent conflicts are between clans involving access to and control over natural and political resources. Acts of revenge based on these initial causes and failure to comply with the terms of peace agreements, including diya payments, perpetuate and escalate conflicts over time.
- Most cases identified involve conflicts that had lasted for more than ten years, with many dating back to the Barre regime or even the colonial era.
- Peace enforcement mechanisms appear to have a positive impact on the effectiveness and durability of reconciliation initiatives.
- Broader reconciliation activities, including social and cultural activities and joint community development projects, appear to have a positive impact on the effectiveness and durability of reconciliation initiatives, especially when combined with effective enforcement mechanisms.
- Prominent roles of women and youth appear to have a positive impact on the effectiveness and durability of reconciliation initiatives.



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KEY RECOMMENDATIONS:

Donors should:

- Incorporate peace enforcement mechanisms into reconciliation programming.
- Incorporate broader social, cultural and developmental activities into programming.
- Provide space for participatory discussions at the outset to secure wider community support for the meaningful participation of women and youth groups in reconciliation processes.
- Ensure partnering and delivery decisions continue to actively reinforce local ownership.
- Consider engaging sensitively with influential community groups to explore the feasibility of securing modifications to Xeers to move away from practices which perpetuate cycles of conflict, including unrealistic diya payments and a focus on collective accountability.
- Consider coordinating with the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation National Reconciliation Framework to deliver programmes in advance of Wadajir Framework interventions.

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES

SSF commissioned this research to identify and understand the instances of successful (or most successful) reconciliation in Somalia, study the common characteristics of successful reconciliation, and consider how best to replicate this in feasible and effective ways for long-term peacebuilding. As a starting point, the research team sought to identify the different types of programmes related to local reconciliation, community security, policing–community dialogue, and similar initiatives delivered in recent years to identify examples of successful (or most successful) reconciliation. To complement this, the team sought to identify local reconciliation programming best practices and recommend how success can be enhanced and replicated across Somalia. The research looked at the current programming, policy and capacity building initiatives and aimed to identify how they can work in concert to advance local inter-clan conflict resolution and build towards more durable reconciliation.

One particular facet of exploration was the role of peace enforcement. While reconciliation initiatives often focus on actions that build constructive relationships between conflicting groups, anecdotally, examples such as the successful Galkayo reconciliation experience since 2017 suggest that peace enforcement may be an important factor in durability. In this regard, the research sought to better understand whether and how peace enforcement plays an important role within local reconciliation, and what this subsequently means for reconciliation programming.

The research considered the extent to which women, youth, and marginalised groups have been involved (or not) and whether there were any connections to efficacy and impact, thus applying a gender and social inclusion lens.

With this in mind, the research aimed to understand the contextual circumstances, programmatic approaches, and institutional interlinkages that support effective and durable local reconciliation in Somalia.

The objectives of this study are to:

- Map the initiatives of local reconciliation and their linkages with peace enforcement in Somalia, considering various approaches.
- Identify the more successful cases of local reconciliation initiatives based on an agreed set of criteria.
- Identify and articulate the typical characteristics of local reconciliation programming best practice from analysing the selected cases.
- Consider the extent to which women, youth, and marginalised groups have been involved (or not) and whether there are any connections to efficacy and impact.
- Extract the lessons learned from the cases selected and propose approaches for replicating best practice and harmonisation of programming, policy and capacity building initiatives to advance local conflict resolution, and building towards more durable reconciliation.

METHODOLOGY

In Phase 1, the research team conducted a desk review of documents and datasets relevant to the study's themes. Sources included thematic and geographic reports by international agencies and local NGOs, academic literature and technical reports accessible through specialised websites, as well as Somali and international news articles and social media. In parallel, the research team consulted 16 Somali and international experts. The literature review profiled 24 cases of local reconciliation. The team analysed each case focusing on the principal stakeholders and their roles, the role of women, the contextual and programmatic factors relevant to the outcome, the presence—or otherwise—of peace enforcement mechanisms, and the outcome.

Based on the review and initial cross-analysis of the cases, in consultation with SSF, we developed a set of criteria for selecting case studies for Phase 2. These criteria are reproduced in Table 1 below:

TABLE 1: CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF CASE STUDIES

Characteristic	Selection Criteria
Success	Success / moderate success / failure
Role of women	Prominent / 'traditional' role of women
Enforcement mechanism	Presence / absence of enforcement mechanism
"Reconciliation" elements	Presence / absence of "reconciliation" elements
Location	Across Federal Member States
Clan composition	Homogeneous / heterogeneous
Date	Within last ten years, to assist interviewee information recall
Funding source	Locally / internationally funded

SSF selected 9 case studies from the cases identified in Phase 1 for further investigation through primary field data collection in Phase 2. The cases selected and the reasons for their selection are identified in Table 2 overleaf.

TABLE 2: LIST OF CASES STUDIES SELECTED FOR PHASE 2

#	Selected Case Studies	Relevant Criteria	Location of Fieldwork
1	C08 - Jijeele and Gaalje'el	1. Success 2. Prominent role of women 3. Community-based 5. Hirshabelle 6. Dominant clan 7. 2005 8. Locally funded	Beletweyne
2	C09 - Sa'ad and Saleebaan	1. Failure 3. Security actor 5. Galmudug 7. 2007 8. Locally funded (part)	Galkayo
3	C11 - Walamoy and Mohamed Muse	1. Moderate success 2. Role of women 3. Clan-based actor 5. Hirshabelle 7. 2014 8. Internationally funded Other - minority clan	Jowhar
4	C15 - Habr Gidir and Majeerteen	1. Success 3. Security actor 5. Galmudug 7. 2017 8. Internationally funded	Galkayo
5	C18 - Bimal and Habr Gidir	1. Success 3. Community/security actor 5. South West State 7. 2018 8. Internationally funded	Mogadishu
6	C19 - Hobyo District Reconciliation Forums	1. Success 3. Government actor 4. Peace dividend projects 5. Galmudug 7. 2018 8. Internationally funded	Galkayo/Mogadishu/SSF contacts
7	C21 - Hawraarsame & Habryaqub & Marehan sub-clans	1. Moderate success 3. Al-Shabab 5. Jubbaland 7. 2019 8. Locally funded	Gedo region
8	C23 - Joint Galkayo Peacebuilding Initiative, Sa'ad, and Leekase	1. Success 3. Community/security actor 4. Peace dividend projects 5. Galmudug 7. 2020 8. Internationally funded	Galkayo
9	C25 - Majeerteen and Awramale	1. Moderate success 2. Role of women 3. Women's group/government 5. Jubbaland 7. 2021 8. Internationally funded	Kismayo

To further investigate the 9 cases selected, the research team interviewed 48 sources in person or by telephone in 6 locations—Mogadishu, Galkayo, Kismayo, Beletweyne, Gedo region in Jubbaland, and Hiran region in Hirshabelle—during August and September 2021. The empirical data resulted in 9 case studies. We present the summaries in section 4 below.¹

The analysis and recommendations provided in this report are based on the review of the existing literature and analysis of 24 cases completed in Phase 1 and the investigation of 9 cases based on field travel and primary data collection in Phase 2.

DEFINITIONS

While the research did not seek to develop a new, definitive, normative framework for reconciliation in Somalia, there was nevertheless value deemed in arriving at a working definition of some key concepts to provide an analytical framework for the research:

Clan – For brevity, this report uses the word “clan,” even when referring to sub- or sub-sub-clans. In each case, we clarify the genealogy of relevant groups.

Enforcement mechanism – Is taken to mean any structure, process, or actor intended to enforce the terms of a peace agreement. Enforcement mechanisms could be security forces, community-based structures, local/regional/national government representatives, or religious actors.

Failure – Describes a process which either does not succeed in stopping the violence, or stops the violence only for a limited time, with conflict returning in the immediate or medium term.

Moderate success – Describes a process which successfully stops the violence, but which does not go beyond that by seeking to address the underlying drivers of conflict or attempting to strengthen intercommunal relationships.

Reconciliation – Using the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs, and Reconciliation (MOIFAR) National Reconciliation Framework (NRF) definition of dhab-u-heshiin as a conceptual anchor,² this research focusses on processes of social reconciliation undertaken in Somalia since 1991, in accordance with the SIDA definition of “a societal process that involves mutual acknowledgement of past suffering and the changing of destructive attitudes and behaviour into constructive relationships toward

sustainable peace”.³ This definition incorporates both ‘male’ and ‘female’ gendered components: the return to ‘order’ and the ‘rules-based society’, and future-oriented and relationship-focused, respectively.⁴

Stakeholder – This includes anyone with an interest in the conflict and either its perpetuation or resolution, including conflict parties, participants in—and funders of—reconciliation activities, mediators, external actors—including local and international NGOs—local administrations and security/justice actors, wider communities—including groups such as women, youth, and minority clans—businesspeople, academics, and the media.

Success – “Successful” reconciliation describes a process that goes beyond the cessation of conflict between parties. It includes the establishment and maintenance of structures and procedures intended to build mutual understanding and positive relationships between communities capable of addressing and resolving underlying conflict drivers and preventing tensions from escalating into violence in future.

Violent conflict – Is defined as the occurrence of at least two armed clashes between two or more opposing groups within one year.

The cases identified in Phase 1 are abbreviated as “C01”, while those investigated in Phase 2 are abbreviated as “CS15”.

All the interview notes are available to SSF for review, as well as the Excel sheets produced from Atlas.ti aggregating all the evidence from primary and secondary data for each research question.

STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

In section 3, we set out the cases identified in Phase 1, followed by summaries of the 9 case studies undertaken in Phase 2 in section 4. In section 5, we then present the key findings emerging from the analysis of all cases and lessons learned, followed by the recommendations in section 6.

LIST OF PHASE 1 CASES

TABLE 3: SYNOPSIS OF CASES - PHASE 1

Code	Case Synopsis
C01	The process involved reconciliation of inter-clan conflicts in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Barre regime in 1991, leading to a political reconciliation between the Isaaq clans which dominated the Somali National Movement and the clans which had sided with the Barre regime, culminating in the foundation of Somaliland as an autonomous territory in 1993.
C02	This case involved historic contestation pre-dating the colonial period over control of grazing land and water resources, and subsequent increasingly violent clashes over control of the strategic city of Galkayo, up to and during the 1990s, between Hawiye and Majeerteen clans.
C03	This case involved the reconciliation of conflicts between eight clans of the Hiran region by the Somali Reconciliation Committee in 1994.
C04	A political reconciliation process during the 1990s in the relatively stable and demographically homogenous northeast region, within the context of civil war violence perpetrated by Hawiye in Mogadishu and beyond against Darod/Majeerteen, and the successive failures of national reconciliation efforts, leading to the formation of the semi-autonomous Puntland administration in 1998.
C05	In 2002, conflict broke out within the Digil-Mirifle clan because of splits within the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) leadership. These related to the formation of the regional administration and deepened in 2006 reflecting a broader rift within the Transitional Federal Government—including its RRA representatives—over its relocation to Baidoa. The split led to intense fighting between the two wings of the RRA, which then degenerated into a wider clan conflict involving most of the Digil-Mirifle clans.
C06	Violence erupted in 2004 between Hubeer and Yantaar clans over control of, and entitlement to, productive land and water catchments around Idale village, in the context of periodic conflict over water resources since the 1970s and wider tensions over control of Idale village itself.
C07	This case involved conflict in 2004–5 between Marehan and Garre over control of El Wak town in Gedo region, in Jubbaland on the Kenyan border.
C08	This case involved the violent conflict between the Jijeele and Gaalje'el clans in 2005 around the town of Buqda Aqabl, in the area adjoining Hiran and Middle Shabelle regions, based on long-standing grievances and competition within and between them for natural and political resources.
C09	In 2004, the long-running, low-intensity conflict between Sa'ad and Saleebaan-Hawiye clans—involving disputes over grazing areas and killings and looting of livestock—erupted into violent conflict. The conflict, which had remained unaddressed since the civil war era due to absence of Xeer between the communities and effective local government authority, was finally resolved at a peace conference in Adado in 2007.
C10	The 2007 Burtinle peace initiative was one of a series of efforts to resolve a recurring conflict between Majeerteen and Dhulbahante clans over productive rangelands lying across the border in Ethiopia, with its roots in the pre-1991 period.
C11	This case involved prominent religious and women leaders and elders reconciling a conflict over control of sugar plantations between the Walamoy and Mohamed Muse around Jowhar in the Middle Shabelle region of Hirshabelle in 2014. Somali Peace Line implemented the process, in partnership with Life & Peace Institute (LPI), with EU/SIDA funding.
C12*	This case was Conflict Dynamics International's "Political Action & Reconciliation in Somalia" programme, which supported communities in the districts of Jubbaland, Puntland, South West State, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and Benadir from 2016–2017, by contributing to enhanced human security, reconciliation, a culture of peace, gender equity, and improved relationships between communities, local government and the federal system.
C13*	Since 2015, LPI has supported Somali Women's Solidarity Organisation in the implementation of a women-led peacebuilding initiative across Jubbaland, including women-centred dialogues in Kismayo in 2016.
C14	This case involved the resolution in 2017, with the intervention of then Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire, of a five-year conflict between two militias belonging to the Fiqi Muhumed Dir clan, resulting from political tensions between Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama and the Federal Government of Somalia in Galmudug.
C15	In 2015 and 2016, violence broke out between the Habr Gidir and Majeerteen in Galkayo, triggered by tensions over the imbalance of investment development in the north compared to the south (including by the international community) along the longstanding fault line between them. This was exacerbated by the Galmudug state formation process and ultimately represented the final collapse of the 1993 Mudug Accord.
C16*	This case is Saferworld's "Restoring Stable Communities" programme, which supported the safety and security of communities in Mogadishu, Kismayo, and Baidoa from 2017–2019.
C17	This case involves the reconciliation by Zam Foundation (ZZF) in 2018 of a long-running conflict between Ayr and Hawadle communities over access to pastureland and water in the border areas in Mahas and Mataban districts in Hiran region, Hirshabelle.


C18	This case involves the reconciliation in 2018 of historic inter-clan grievances between the Bimal and Habr Gidir over control of the Lower Shabelle administration and particularly its capital, Marka, as well as grazing rights. AMISOM's liberation of Marka and surrounding areas from Al-Shabab control in 2013 resulted in the re-emergence of these historic grievances and the eruption of conflict in 2017.
C19	This was SSF's Hobyo District Reconciliation Forums programme, aimed at reconciling the clans in Hobyo District in Galmudug state, through identifying unresolved issues related to conflicts and allowing local communities to discuss their grievances and address them. The reconciliation process in 2018 was intended to lead to the resolution of outstanding disputes between the communities as a precursor to the formation of Hobyo district council within the Wadajir Framework.
C20	This case was part of SSF's Joint Galkayo Peacebuilding Initiatives Project. The process involved reconciliation of inter-clan conflict in 2019 between militias from Habr Gidir and Dir clans in Garbacad village along the Towfiq-Abfarwaqo axis in eastern Mudug, triggered by revenge killings as part of a historic conflict between the neighbouring clans over access to grazing land and water resources.
C21	This case involved the reconciliation by Al-Shabab of a conflict between Marehan clans in Gedo region in 2019 after centuries of conflict.
C22	This case involved reconciliation by Al-Shabab of a conflict between the Hawadle and Abgaal in Hiran region in 2019.
C23	This was part of SSF's Joint Galkayo Peacebuilding Initiatives Project in June 2020, intended to bring an end to a 40-year-old conflict between Sa'ad and Leelkase clans over access to water and grazing land, along the Lanwaley-Saxo axis in Western Mudug.
C24	This case involved a conflict in April 2020 between Shamta-Alemod and Gaalje'el over pasture and water resources in Wanlaweyn district, Lower Shabelle region, South West State.
C25	This case involved a prominent role for the Kismayo Women's Peace Platform in partially resolving a conflict between the Majeerteen and Awramale clans over disputed pastureland around the villages of Dalsan and Qandal in Kismayo region in 2020–21.
C26	This was a case implemented in 2020 by ZZF with SSF funding, to reconcile a long-running conflict over access to pastureland and water between Marehan and Ayr, and Marehan and Dir clans around Balanbale town in Galmudug.
C27	This case involved conflict between the inhabitants of the villages of Daymasame and Maandhere in Hirshabelle in July 2021. The Hirshabelle Insider Peacebuilders Network mediated the conflict, a community-based initiative supported by the Berghof Foundation's "Supporting Community Peacebuilders and Government Officials to Promote Reconciliation in Hirshabelle State" programme.
C28.1-C28.4*	This case includes brief overviews of four donor-funded peacebuilding/reconciliation programmes that may contain elements of interest to SSF: C28.1 - Katuni Citizen-Directed Negotiated Accountability programme in ten villages in Afmadow District, Jubbaland, 2015 C28.2 - Green String Network, SOYDEN & Wajir Peace University Trust Quraca Nabadda (Tree of Peace) programme C28.3 - World Health Organisation psychosocial healing programme, Kismayo, Baidoa, Dollow, Mogadishu, Galkayo, 2019–2021 C28.4 - Berghof multi-track dialogue in Galmudug, 2019–2020.

* These donor-funded peacebuilding cases which did not address specific conflicts were not included in the analysis.

SUMMARY OF PHASE 2 CASE STUDIES

CASE STUDY 8

This case involved the conflict between the Jijeele and Gaalje'el in 2005 around the town of Buqda Aqabl (or Buq Aqable or Buqdaaqable), in the area adjoining Hiran and Middle Shabelle regions of Hirshabelle State. The conflict was the result of long-standing grievances and competition within and between the two clans over natural and political resources. The Hawadle-dominated Hiran Council of Elders mediated the reconciliation process under the leadership of the highly respected Hawadle ugaas, or titled elder. Elders from the two conflicting clans formed a joint standing committee which, with the support of the Hiran Council of Elders and the moral authority of the Hawadle ugaas in particular, was able to enforce the terms of the peace agreement reached between the parties. This case was a success. Sources indicate that the joint standing committee helped to maintain the peace, including through revising the mechanisms governing the shared use of crucial resources, including at times of increased tensions such as droughts and floods, by removing such issues from the remit of the clan militias.



CASE STUDY 9

In 2004, the long-running, low-intensity conflict between Sa'ad and Saleebaan escalated, involving disputes over grazing areas and killings and looting of livestock. The conflict had remained unaddressed since the civil war era due to the absence of an established Xeer between the communities and effective local government authority. In 2006, the parties negotiated a ceasefire with the support of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and in 2007 organised a peace conference in Adado—but failed to deliver a lasting solution to the conflict.

Women from the two clans selected 20 influential female representatives from both conflicting clans and other clans in the area to participate in the conference as a joint official delegation. Unusually, the women peace activists were permitted to present their position at the conference. Sources assert that their intervention and their challenging of the elders to reach an agreement contributed to the initial success of the process. However, this case was a failure. The process resulted in stability for four years, from 2007–2011, but sources suggest that the failure of the accord to clarify ownership of land or water sources, as well as to ensure that diya (compensation) payments were made as pledged, may have contributed to violence re-emerging in 2011.

CASE STUDY 11

This case involved an attempt to reconcile a conflict between the Walamoy and Mohamed Muse clans over the control of productive farms and sugar plantations around Jowhar in the Middle Shabelle region of Hirshabelle State in 2014. Somali Peace Line (SPL) implemented the process in partnership with the Life & Peace Institute (LPI) and with EU/SIDA funding. SPL negotiated a ceasefire with the clan militias and then held a series of reconciliation meetings to try and address the root causes of the conflict, resulting in the conclusion of a peace agreement. Sources report that a Joint Reconciliation Committee, comprising elders from the two conflicting clans, was responsible for overseeing implementation of the agreement; support came from the Hirshabelle State police and Somali National Army (SNA) and AMISOM forces, as well as the district and regional courts and the Middle Shabelle regional and Hirshabelle State administrations. This case was a moderate success. Sources stated that while the peace agreement has held since 2014, it represented a ceasefire rather than a resolution of the underlying conflict drivers; tackling the key issue of farm ownership was postponed until the establishment of an effective and equitable justice system.

CASE STUDY 15

In 2015 and 2016, violence broke out between the Habr Gidir and Majeerteen in Galkayo. Historic tensions over access to natural resources in the Mudug region, a perceived imbalance of development resources between north and south Galkayo, and a longstanding fault line exacerbated by the Galmudug state formation process triggered the conflict. These outbreaks of violence signified the final collapse of the 1993 Mudug Accord. In December 2017, the parties negotiated a ceasefire and wider agreement to try and address the underlying causes of the conflict. Members of the clan militias were integrated into new regional police units and a new joint SNA unit was created (consisting of Darod and Hawiye members drawn from existing units), and state-level ministerial committees were assigned to oversee the agreement's implementation. A Joint Ceasefire Committee and the Mudug Joint Peace Committee brought together elders from all of Galkayo's clans to share oversight responsibility. The process involved prominent roles of women's and youth groups, including bringing members of the formerly opposing communities into shared spaces and activities, as well as community development projects.

This case was a success. Sources report that peace has been maintained in Galkayo since the deployment of the joint and integrated security forces in December 2017, and that the absence of conflict—particularly the previously constant cycle of revenge attacks—has enabled communities to move more freely around the centre of Galkayo. This has contributed to improved intercommunal relationships and has fostered increased economic activity and infrastructure development in the city.



CASE STUDY 18

In 2013, the AMISOM liberation of Marka and surrounding areas in Lower Shabelle from Al-Shabab (AS) control prompted the re-emergence of historic grievances between the dominant Biamal and Habr Gidir over land ownership and control of the emerging local administration. These grievances escalated to widespread conflict across the region that lasted for five years.

Initial informal contacts between elders from the two clans in 2017 led to a formal reconciliation initiative supported by the federal Ministry of Interior, involving dozens of reconciliation meetings in Mogadishu, Afgoye, Janaale, and Marka, and the elders appointing a peace steering committee consisting of 21 members from both clans. The process concluded in March 2018 with a peace agreement.

Both clans formed a joint women's committee, consisting of eight members from each clan. These women actively participated in the reconciliation process, holding initial meetings with militia leaders, and elders from both clans to promote a ceasefire and subsequently to help secure acceptance of the peace agreement by the militia leaders. A group of women from Marka district launched an awareness campaign that helped to reinforce the ceasefire, including in rural communities.

Sources reported that the district authority was responsible for observing implementation of the peace agreement, with support from Reconciliation Committees established in target districts and the SNA and the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). Some militia members were integrated into the SNA in Lower Shabelle and NISA in Marka district.

This case was a success. The peace has held since 2018, with minor incidents successfully managed by the clan elders working with the district administration through the Reconciliation Committees. This included the timely arrest of perpetrators by SNA and NISA units and the application of the sanctions outlined in the peace agreement. Sources report that improved security and trust between communities has facilitated the revival of basic services, including transport and education, and community development projects have provided tangible mutual benefits to both communities. Importantly, power-sharing issues were also resolved, leading to the establishment of a functioning district administration.





CASE STUDY 23

This case was part of SSF's Joint Gaalkayo Peacebuilding Initiatives Project. The initiative entailed a three-phase process, with reconciliation conferences scheduled to be held in Bandiraadley, Galdogob, and Gaalkayo in June–July 2020, intended to bring an end to a 40-year-old conflict between the Sa'ad and Leelkase clans over access to water and grazing land along the Lanwaley–Saxo axis in Western Mudug. In June 2020, Interpeace facilitated a reconciliation conference in Bandiraadley in Galmudug, at which the two clans signed a peace agreement, followed by a second conference in Galdogob in Puntland. The agreement included broader reconciliation activities to promote intercommunal integration through joint community structures and activities, and the implementation of “peace dividend” community-led development work. This included the construction of a peace centre in Lanwaley to help address the development imbalance in South Mudug that had fuelled the conflict.

The clans formed a Joint Peace Committee (JPC) and a Joint Security Committee to enforce the terms of the agreement in collaboration with the joint SNA and integrated police forces based in Gaalkayo. These forces include both Sa'ad and Leelkase membership and formed and dispatched temporary units consisting of those clan members to mediate local issues that could undermine the peace process.

This case was a success. The agreement has held since 2020 and went beyond a ceasefire, providing for free movement of the communities and free grazing of their livestock, while prohibiting construction of *berkedo* (water catchments) and further urbanisation pending agreement of clan boundaries in the final phase of the reconciliation process. The agreement also provided for joint security structures—established by the Galmudug and Puntland administrations in consultation with the JPC—to identify and mitigate security risks between the communities, and initiated community development programmes to promote cooperation and integration between the communities and address the development deficit in South Mudug.

CASE STUDY 21

This case involved the attempted reconciliation by Al-Shabab (AS) of an intra-Marehan conflict in Gedo region in 2019 relating to centuries of persecution of the minority Hawraarsame and Habryaqub by the major sub-clans, and more recent conflict over their exclusion from pasture and water resources and representation on the regional and district administrations. In August 2019, AS held a conference in the Ceelcadde district of Gedo region which resulted in the pronouncement of diya payments to the minority clans. AS enforced the terms of the agreement by ensuring diya amounts were paid.

This case was a moderate success. Peace has held since 2019, although sources state that the process amounted to a ceasefire rather than a reconciliation, with the principal conflict drivers remaining unaddressed and the Hawraarsame and Habryaqub still at the mercy of the major sub-clans. Sources further reported very limited interaction between the Hawraarsame and Habryaqub and the major sub-clans after conclusion of the process, with communities still divided along sub-clan lines.



CASE STUDY 25

This case involved a prominent role for the Kismayo Women's Peace Platform (KWPP) in partially resolving a conflict between the Majeerteen and Awramale; the dispute erupted in two phases between 2018 and 2020 over disputed pastureland around the villages of Dalsan and Qandal in Kismayo region. KWPP negotiated and enforced a ceasefire in the first phase, while the Jubbaland state administration and Saransoor elders mediated the second phase and secured an agreement between the parties. During the second phase, the Awramale also referred the case to AS for adjudication because of concerns that the Jubbaland administration was biased against them.

KWPP were heavily involved in securing and—with the support of the Jubbaland state police—enforcing the initial ceasefire in 2018, as well as mediating between the conflicting parties and helping them to reach an agreement. In 2020, the Jubbaland Ministry of Interior led on the conclusion of the peace agreement. The state and local governments, along with an elders' committee, assumed responsibility for ensuring its implementation through enforcement by the police. This case was a moderate success. Sources reported that the activities of the enforcement actors had helped maintain peace between the communities, increased interactions between them, and enabled the demobilisation of clan militias.

KEY FINDINGS & ANALYSIS

Several findings emerge from the analysis of the case studies presented above. First, we present the key programmatic factors that appear to have contributed to positive outcomes. Then, we continue with an analysis of the contextual factors in section 5.2.

- Most conflicts are between clans and about access to and control over natural and political resources. Cycles of revenge killings initiated by these initial causes often perpetuate and escalate conflicts over time, with many dating back to the fall of the Barre regime in 1991 or even the colonial era
- Of the 12 cases identified in Phase 1 that satisfy our definition of success, all featured enforcement mechanisms of some kind, 8 included broader reconciliation activities, 8 included a prominent role of women and 5 were locally funded
- Of the 9 case studies investigated in Phase 2, all involved:
 - conflicts over resources: 9 natural, 4 natural and political
 - negotiations between elders leading to agreement and cessation of violence for at least a time
 - an enforcement mechanism of some kind (8 had more than one)
- Seven of the 9 cases had lasted for more than 10 years
- 5 of the cases included women performing a prominent role (C08, C09, C15, C19, C25)
- 1 case involved a prominent role for youth (C15)
- 5 of the cases met our definition of success (C08, C15, C18, C19, C23). Of these:
 - All included at least one peace enforcement mechanism
 - 4 included broader reconciliation activities (C15, C18, C19, C23)
 - 4 included a prominent role for women (C08, C15, C18, C19)
 - 2 involved an effective mediator (C08, C15)
 - 1 was locally funded (C08), 3 were donor-funded (C18, C19, C23), 1 was a mix of local and donor funding (C15)
- 3 cases were a “moderate success”: peace was sustained but the underlying conflict drivers were not addressed (C11, C21, C25)
- 1 case was a “failure”: peace was not sustained and violence returned (C09)

PROGRAMMATIC FACTORS

The table below presents a summary of the key programmatic characteristics of the 24 cases identified in this research. We analyse these characteristics in the sections that follow.

TABLE 4: PROGRAMMATIC CHARACTERISTICS OF CASES ANALYSED

Category	Total cases	Peace enforcement mechanism	Broader reconciliation activities	Prominent role of women	Effective mediator	Prominent role of youth	Local ownership/funding
Successes	12	12	8	7	7	4	5
Moderate successes	8	6	0	1	6	0	4
Failures	4	4	0	2	2	0	2
Total	24	22	8	10	13	4	11

The case studies suggest the following programmatic factors may contribute to positive outcomes, in decreasing order of strength of evidence in successful cases:

- Peace enforcement mechanisms (12 cases)
- Broader reconciliation activities (8 cases)
- Prominent role of women (8 cases)
- Effective mediator (7 cases)
- Local ownership and funding (5 cases)
- Prominent role of youth (4 cases)

The most significant programmatic differences between successful and moderately successful cases (most of which also included peace enforcement mechanisms) were the absence of broader reconciliation activities and prominent roles of women and youth.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

We have defined “peace enforcement mechanisms” as any structure, process, or actor intended to enforce the terms of a peace agreement. These mechanisms took various forms: security forces (12), community-based structures (12), local/regional/national government authorities (9) and religious actors (3). Peace enforcement mechanisms appear to enhance the effectiveness and durability of reconciliation efforts: all 12 successful cases in Phase 1 included them, and all 5 successful cases in Phase 2 included them, with 4 having more than one. They featured in 6 of 8 moderately successful cases and 3 of the 4 failures.

Enforcement mechanisms appeared in the 12 successful cases in the following forms and frequency:

- Community actors – these were committees of elders from the conflicting clans, occasionally with representatives from additional groups such as military officials and women’s groups, created to oversee the reconciliation process and monitor the implementation of the peace agreement (7 cases)
- Security actors – these were federal and state security forces, including SNA units, federal or state police, and National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and AMISOM forces (7 cases)
- Political actors – these were state, regional, and district administrations effectively acting as the guarantors of peace agreements (5 cases).

Of the enforcement mechanisms in 10 of the 12 successful cases, 3 were community actors, 3 were security actors, and in 4 there was a combination of both community and security actors. In 2 successful cases, political actors were the sole enforcement actor, and they featured in combination with community and security actors in 3 successful cases. In the 9 case studies in Phase 2, which permitted a more detailed interrogation of how peace enforcement operates, enforcement mechanisms appeared in the form of 7 community actors, 6 security actors, 4 political actors, and 2 religious actors.

Within the 9 case studies, high levels of trust were reported in peace enforcement actors in 6 of the case studies, including all successful cases and the 1 failure. This was most often attributed to the joint or integrated nature of these actors. The community actors in the 7 case studies included elders from both conflicting clans, and the security

actors in 4 case studies (3 successes and the 1 failure) consisted of units with members from both clans in conflict (we refer to these as “joint units” in this report) or their militias (referred to here as “integrated units”). These were either newly established joint SNA units including membership from both clans (CS15, CS23 – both in Galkayo), or militia members from both clans joining new integrated police units (CS15, CS23) or pre-existing SNA and NISA units (CS18 - Marka) as part of the reconciliation processes.

In Case Study 18 in Marka, militia members joined official state security forces and the integrated units nominally operated under the pre-existing chain of command. However, sources expressed concerns that such integration exercises can be superficial, and that clan identities could be quickly reasserted if intercommunal violence returned. While this did not happen in Case Study 18, other research supports this claim.⁵ Integration exercises are sometimes announced more for political gain than to address security needs, with the creation of jobs for militia members in SNA, police, or Darawiish units conferring political benefits on the officials leading the process. Militia members joining integrated units are often not paid in the amounts or forms they had been led to expect (for example receiving only food and ammunition rather than salaries), are often required to provide their own weapons, and often maintain their previous clan militia structures within the integrated units. Without sustainable funding they may resort to self-financing arrangements (such as taxing vehicles on checkpoints) and without specific organisational arrangements, their continuing unit formation and command structure will allow for the easy reversion to clan loyalty in time of need. Even where they do not lead to the dissolution of integrated units, these factors reduce their ability to effectively and impartially resolve issues including breaches of peace agreements, which would lead to the accumulation of grievances and potentially a return to violence.⁶

Communities value enforcement mechanisms because they see them as effective means of ending the continual cycles of conflict that have characterised many of the cases identified in this research, perpetuated by failures to adhere to the terms of peace agreements—including payment of diya and acts of revenge for previous incidents. They value particularly the role of elders’ committees and state security actors. The community-based

structures in the case studies consisted of elders from both clans in conflict, each representing the interests of their respective communities, who had confidence in them. They functioned as early warning mechanisms, detecting and discussing emerging tensions, often mitigating the risk of escalation of incidents by leveraging their moral authority to instruct their respective clan militias to withdraw from potential flashpoints, as well as by liaising with security forces.

In 3 successful cases, community actors performed effective enforcement roles by themselves. This was achieved primarily through the symbolic power of elders’ public pledges to honour the terms of peace agreements and their ability to exercise moral authority over their clan militias (C06, CS8, C10: Idale, Hirshabelle, and Burtinle respectively). The power of the “word given” in Somali oral culture is evidenced in the importance accorded to the public announcement at Beletweyne airport of the terms of the agreement by elders of both conflicting clans in C10, and the use of public meetings and local media to disseminate the content of the agreement in C06.

The sources also highlighted the value placed by communities on the roles of state security actors—predominantly state police and federal SNA units—both in deterrence and enforcement. The involvement of security forces signals to local communities that violations of peace agreements will have consequences, often for the individuals involved and not just their diya-paying group. In the cases we analysed, these forces operated under the command of the relevant military or civilian authorities, seeking to enforce the terms of peace agreements, sometimes in consultation with elders from the conflicting clans. Linking security and community actors enables the exchange of information and coordinated responses to security incidents. Examples include the district level Reconciliation Committees bringing together clan elders, district administration, and security officials in Marka in Case Study 18, and the meetings between the Joint Peace Committee and joint SNA and integrated police units in Case Study 23 in Western Mudug. In Case Study 18, the reconciliation committees facilitated the timely arrest of perpetrators by integrated SNA and NISA units and the application of the sanctions outlined in the peace agreement.

In 3 successful cases, security actors were the sole enforcement mechanism (C04, C20, C26). The work of the Somali Women’s Solidarity Organisation (SWSO) in Kismayo (CS25), shows how strengthening interaction and information sharing between police and communities can increase trust and impact the outcome of community dispute resolution processes. In 4 successful cases, community and security actors jointly performed the enforcement role (CS15, C17, CS18, CS23).

5 of the 9 cases including political actors as enforcement mechanisms were successful. In 2 of these (C01, CS19), the political actors were the sole enforcement mechanism, effectively using their political influence to act as guarantors of the agreement. State authorities alone often cannot enforce the terms of peace agreements, they are more effective when working with community and security enforcement mechanisms, as in the other 3 cases (C06, C10, CS18).

Peace agreements that clearly identify transgressions and the sanctions that will be applied, including to individuals and their immediate families rather than traditional diya-paying groups (see section 5.1.8 Xeer, below), appear to assist peace enforcement and contribute to positive outcomes. Of the 7 cases for which such information is available, 5 were successes (C06, CS08, C10, CS18, CS23), and 2 were moderate successes (C14, C27). In C06, around Idale village in Bay region, the agreement was written in the tone of an order beginning with penalties for any breaches, demonstrating the role and authority of the Transitional Federal Government in that case. In C10 in Burtinle, any violation of the peace agreement was subject to a fine and one year imprisonment. In CS18 in Marka, the agreement provided for anyone violating its terms to be arrested by the SNA or NISA and referred to the district court with the application of the sanctions specified in the peace agreement—which sources confirmed were enacted in practice. In CS23 in Western Mudug, the agreement provided for any criminal offence between the two clans to be judged according to Shari’a, with suspects to be apprehended by SNA and police forces in Puntland and Galmudug and judgments to be executed by the formal courts of the two states. In C14, the agreement specified that anyone deliberately killing another person would be executed by the FGS and that anyone committing a criminal act such as inciting violence, undermining stability, disobeying orders from SNA forces, or pointing a gun at another person, would be apprehended by federal forces and referred

to a statutory criminal court. The agreement in C27 in Hirshabelle, guaranteed by the regional administration, provided less specifically for anyone violating its terms to be “brought to justice”.

These findings suggest that several factors increase the effectiveness of enforcement, relating to a combination of the enforcement mechanisms themselves, the interactions between them where more than one are present, and other elements of the reconciliation process. These factors are:

- The legitimacy of the enforcement mechanisms in the eyes of communities, often based on their joint or integrated nature in the case of community and security actors
- Joint community-based structures, most likely consisting of elders from both clans (though membership can be more inclusive), to provide fora for the identification and discussion of emerging tensions and security incidents
- A peace agreement clearly outlining the obligations and responsibilities of both parties—including the shared use of natural resources, as well as the amounts and dates for diya payments—and establishing sanctions for their violation
- Meetings bringing clan leaders and security officials together for the management and de-escalation of intercommunal tensions, and to coordinate responses to conflict or violations of the terms of an agreement, including the timely arrest of perpetrators by security forces and the application of sanctions provided in peace agreements
- Effective enforcement capacity on the part of local security actors. This includes the technical, logistical, and administrative capabilities necessary for army or police units to provide adequate security services to local communities.

Case Study 15, relating to the long-standing conflict between the Habr Gidir and Majeerteen in Galkayo, provides a good example of the benefits resulting from the convergence of these characteristics, as well as the interaction between peace enforcement mechanisms and broader reconciliation activities (see section 5.1.2 Broader Reconciliation Activities, below). The Joint Ceasefire Committee and Joint Peace Committee (JPC) consisted of elders from both clans and enjoyed the trust of both communities.

They reached a ceasefire agreement and the accompanying Xeer clarified how future disputes were to be addressed, while establishing sanctions for violations. The JPC met regularly, which allowed the elders to address emerging tensions and share information with the joint SNA and integrated regional police units, who could manage incidents before they escalated into inter-group conflict. For example, in 2018, an integrated police patrol unit successfully de-escalated an incident when two armed groups clashed in the marketplace.

The process by which enforcement mechanisms are created depends on their nature and varies from case to case. The findings indicate that the conflicting clans nominate elders to create joint community structures responsible for overseeing the implementation of peace agreements and monitoring security incidents. While the composition of these structures varied slightly between cases, elders were always included, accompanied by women in 3 cases (CS9, CS19, CS23) and military officers, intellectuals, religious leaders, and youth representatives in another (CS23). Relevant state authorities at federal, state, and regional levels deploy and provide oversight of security forces (CS9, CS11, CS15, CS18, CS23, CS25), and joint community structures (CS9, CS23), the federal government (CS18) or particularly influential figures oversaw the integration of militia members into those forces or the creation of new joint units (C15).

Case Study 15 in Galkayo also provides a useful illustration of the ad hoc process by which joint and integrated security units can be formed. The case study illustrates the importance of ensuring the buy-in of key personalities to the process, and the challenges involved with attempting to produce a blueprint for replicating the experience elsewhere. Acting in a personal capacity, Ms Ilham Gassar, of the office of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, facilitated introductions between government and security officials from Galmudug and Puntland that laid the foundations for the creation of the joint and integrated units. The integrated police units developed in a somewhat organic process out of a requirement to provide security for the shuttle diplomacy that characterised the initial stages of the reconciliation process.

The mayors, governors, and heads of security from both sides then agreed to the formation of integrated police patrols to provide security in and around the city, comprising of 100 militia members from each clan, operating from police stations in both Galmudug and Puntland and reporting to both police commissioners. The UN Joint Police Programme provided funding. The recently appointed Chief of General Defence Forces (CDF), General Gorod, a Habr Gidir from the south of Galkayo who commanded respect on both sides of the divide, drew on further logistical support from the UN to oversee the formation of the joint SNA unit, created from the predominantly Darod Sector 54 and the mainly Hawiye Sector 21. This unit was deployed to maintain the security of the previously volatile flashpoint in Galkayo market and reported through the established chain of command to the CDF in Mogadishu. While the joint SNA unit forms part of the established military structure, the integrated police unit is yet to be absorbed within the Somali Police Force and so remains reliant on donor support, raising questions over its sustainability. This experience underlines the importance of ensuring the buy-in of key political and security figures.

Sources also indicated the value of joint development programmes, such as the SSF-funded road in Galkayo, in convincing previously conflicting communities of the value of joint structures in providing the security necessary for the benefits of such projects to be realised. A reasonable starting point for seeking to better understand these dynamics and their practical implications would be to engage with influential political figures such as mayors, governors, SNA commanders, and police commissioners in target locations.

While the research findings indicated that effective enforcement mechanisms were necessary to achieve reconciliation (in that all successful cases included them), they also suggested that by themselves, such mechanisms were insufficient. 10 cases identified in Phase 1 included enforcement mechanisms but were not successful (C02, C07, C09, C11, C14, C21, C22, C24, C25, C27).

BROADER RECONCILIATION ACTIVITIES

All 8 cases identified that included broader reconciliation activities were successful. These included cultural and outreach activities, such as sporting and musical events designed to bring communities together and meetings, training and education sessions to 'sensitise' the idea of peace among them, and joint development programmes intended to deliver practical and tangible benefits to both communities.

The findings indicated that effective enforcement mechanisms were a necessary but insufficient component of successful reconciliation. They do not suggest that the same is true of broader reconciliation activities. While the broader reconciliation activities appear to contribute to positive outcomes, as 8 successful cases did include them, and no moderately successful cases or failures did, they do not appear to be an essential ingredient of success, as 4 successful cases did not include them (C01, C04, CS08, C10).

The research did, however, identify the beneficial interaction between enforcement mechanisms and broader reconciliation activities in successful cases, with peace enforcement working to create a secure and stable space in which reconciliation activities could address grievances and promote interaction to help build relationships between communities. This is significant as constructive and forward-looking relationships constitute a crucial element of the definition of "successful" reconciliation adopted by this research. The findings support the assertion that the combination of enforcement mechanisms with broader reconciliation activities do appear to contribute to positive outcomes: 66% of successful cases included both components, compared to 0% of moderately successful cases and 0% of failures.

In Phase 2, Case Studies 15, 18, 19 and 23, in Galkayo, Marka, Hobyo, and Western Mudug respectively, provided evidence that reinforced existing awareness of the beneficial impact of activities—such as social and cultural activities and joint community development programmes—in helping to build positive relationships between communities. The findings highlighted the value of music and sporting events, often delivered by youth and women's groups, as well as programmes featuring groups from both communities working together to provide tangible improvements in daily life, including issues like sanitation and streetlighting

in areas that had previously been sharply divided but where communities were now starting to interact, such as Galkayo and Hobyo. Such activities can also help address underlying conflict drivers, such as the developmental imbalance between north and south Mudug in Case Study 23. The case studies show that these kinds of activities can deliver benefits to formerly antagonistic communities simultaneously, helping to facilitate increased interaction and to lessen feelings of mistrust and resentment between them.

While the role and possible impact of such activities is already documented,⁷ the research findings provide additional insights on their interaction with enforcement mechanisms in the context of reconciliation processes and how, together, they appear to increase the prospect for successful outcomes.

THE PROMINENT ROLE OF WOMEN

Women played prominent roles in 8 of the 12 successful cases, including 4 of the 5 successful case studies (CS8, CS15, CS18, CS19). These included outreach activities whereby women travelled across clan lines and negotiated with militia leaders to secure ceasefires; organise events promoting intercommunal interaction, such as the International Women's Day event in Galkayo in 2017; and secured communities' support for—and engagement in—reconciliation processes, making substantive contributions to those processes as participants in conferences, signatories to peace agreements, and members of joint community committees established to oversee their implementation.

Sources also identified the important and multifaceted roles of women in mobilising and perpetuating violent conflict (CS23 and CS25). These roles, which touch on women's political position within Somali culture as guardians of clans' identity, include: financing conflict; actively encouraging family and wider community members to take up arms to defend the rights of their clan and seek revenge for previous incidents (including through advancing belittling gender narratives such as "give me the gun and wear my dress"); providing logistical support to combatants such as food and the concealment of weapons and ammunition; caring for the wounded; as well as participating directly in intelligence collection and fighting.⁸

The nature and extent of women's involvement in starting and continuing conflict perhaps paradoxically also explains their corresponding importance in efforts to advance peace.⁹ The case studies showed that women often play more substantive and meaningful roles in reconciliation processes, both individually and collectively, than indicated in the literature review. This appears to be due to a combination of several factors. The corollary of the expectation on women in their capacity as guardians of clan identity to mobilise their husbands and sons for conflict is the expectation that, as wives and mothers, they will intervene to promote peace. In reality, the practice of exogamous marriage means women often find themselves torn between two conflicting clans, suffering the injury and killing of members of both their birth and extended families. They are often consequently among the strongest proponents of peace and reconciliation, redirecting energies previously expended on inciting and perpetuating conflict towards ending it and repairing relationships. The practice of exogamous marriage, together with women's status as *birmageydo* (meaning they are protected during combat by customary law; trans. "iron shall not enter") and the fact that they are not traditionally viewed as enemies by opponents, enables them to undertake activities, particularly in the early stages of reconciliation processes, which may be too dangerous for men to attempt. These include physically crossing frontlines between opposing clan militias to stop violence and establish ceasefires.

Case studies provided examples of women's leading role in socialising the idea of peace through activities that often mirror those deployed at the start of conflicts. Women activists, in both individual and collective capacities, used a range of tools and settings to discuss the causes of conflicts but also their impact on families and wider communities and the benefits of reconciliation, including organising public gatherings and demonstrations, holding meetings with elders and grassroots peace organisations, and developing print, radio, and social media products. Women's groups such as the Mudug Women's Organisation, the Mudug Women Peace Committee (CS15), and the Kismayo Women's Peace Platform (CS25) target these activities across clan lines. In 2 case studies, women were also actively involved in the substance of the reconciliation processes themselves.

In Case Study 15 in Galkayo, 5 of the 18 members of the reconciliation committee were women, 2 of whom signed the 1st December 2017 peace agreement along with other prominent political, military, and civil society figures and the highest customary authority. In Case Study 19 in Hobyo, 3 of the 11 members of the District Peace and Reconciliation Committee established to oversee the process were women. Sources identify additional women's roles in financing and fundraising reconciliation processes, advocacy with male politicians, cross-clan women-to-women peace meetings, as well as their more 'traditional' role of providing logistical support to conference delegates.¹⁰ Sources also refer to the practice of *godobtir* (exchange of women in marriage to consolidate peace), which was a feature in C10 in Burtinle, though this appears to be a practice imposed on, rather than enacted by, women.

Research shows many men are willing to involve women in processes and power,¹¹ and many sources expressed a positive view of women playing a more active role and identified their contribution to positive outcomes. Nevertheless, resistance to more active and substantive participation by women remains. This can come from several sources, including husbands fearing for their wives' safety, communities not appreciating the potential scope and impact of their inputs, and religious leaders citing Islamic injunctions against women making significant decisions. Case Studies 19 and 25, in Hobyo and Kismayo respectively, support existing findings that the principal source of resistance is older elite men, and in particular elders apparently wary of ceding power, status, and influence in their communities.

Sources (male and female) also expressed appreciation for women's 'traditional' roles. Activities such as providing refreshments and welcoming delegates to conferences, while less substantive than others, are nevertheless valued by community members as essential in facilitating the conferences and meetings that form the bulk of reconciliation processes.

The research indicates that ensuring the meaningful participation of women in reconciliation processes appears to contribute to positive outcomes. This illustrates the value of their inclusion from an outcome-based technical perspective, as well as (equally valid) justifications of equity and inclusivity. Elders remain the principal source of resistance to increased female participation in reconciliation processes. Discussions with elders at the outset of processes may be the most effective means of reducing and overcoming this resistance, framed in a way that identifies the technical benefits women's involvement can bring to the process and its outcome rather than focussing on gender equality.

EFFECTIVE MEDIATOR

The findings indicate that an effective mediator may contribute to positive outcomes. Mediators engaged in 7 of the 12 successful cases identified in Phase 1, and 2 of the 5 successful case studies in Phase 2 (CS8, CS15). Effective mediators can act as trusted and neutral third parties, bringing conflicting sides together in both initial ceasefire negotiations and subsequent substantive discussions, often in neutral locations that boost participants' sense of safety and therefore willingness to engage, as well as facilitating a more balanced and objective exchange of views and assessment of conflict drivers. The findings suggest that these features, in turn, help the conflicting parties to reach an agreement.

Mediators can take various forms, from multilateral organisations, foreign governments, district, regional, and state administrations, to religious actors and elders from third-party clans. The identity of a mediator, and whether they are likely to be accepted and effective, will be determined by the specific context of each case, including the balance of power between the conflicting clans, the status of other local clans, and the presence of any other potentially relevant stakeholders in the area. For example, dominant clans may be reluctant to accept a third-party mediator whose involvement in a reconciliation process may diminish their ability to influence the outcome. Other local clans may be suitable to act as third-party mediators if they are themselves dominant and highly respected in the area, as was the case with the Hawadle in Case Study 8, who were sufficiently powerful to adopt the role of an enforcement mechanism. The context of each case will also determine whether there may be additional local actors who could perform the role of mediator; this could be local, regional, or state administrations that are seen as effective

and impartial (C17, C26), international actors such as the UN (CS15), donor-funded community-based peacebuilding platforms (CS19), or religious actors (C21). Whoever adopts the role of mediator, their role should be monitored throughout the process as part of programme monitoring and evaluation frameworks, to ensure that they maintain the trust of both parties. In Case Study 19, sources reported perceptions of pro-Saleebaan bias on the part of the local implementing agency involved, which they felt adversely impacted the process and possibly affected its outcome.

LOCAL OWNERSHIP AND FUNDING SOURCES

Ownership by recipients and beneficiaries has long been deemed a crucial factor in successful development programming, and reconciliation interventions in fragile states are no exception. Sources confirmed the importance of perceptions of local responsibility and leadership of peace processes in strengthening their credibility and therefore outcomes, as locally driven initiatives are considered to be better rooted in communities and underpinned by local knowledge, experience, and resources. Whether and how to intervene are fundamental considerations for donors in all development scenarios. Not intervening may be a more appropriate course of action where reconciliation initiatives are well-organised, locally-driven, and locally funded processes, such as Case Study 8 involving the Hiran Council of Elders and the moral leadership of the Hawadle ugaas. In some circumstances, donor involvement comes to be seen by some stakeholders as an opportunity for rent-seeking rather than an attempt to deliver meaningful and lasting change.

Where donors decide to engage, consideration should be given to the nature, scope, and visibility of that engagement to maximise the prospects for local ownership. While the first two will vary in accordance with the specific contexts of different programmes and locations, keeping visibility to a minimum is likely to be beneficial. Findings support the assertion that donor provision of funding, technical assistance, and facilitation services delivered through trusted local partners (in ways that do not undermine local ownership) are valued by communities, while overt involvement in substantive reconciliation processes is often not appreciated (C11, C17, CS19, C26).

Sources in Case Study 11, around Jowhar in Middle Shabelle region, identified the contribution of Somali Peace Line to the successful outcome, including their efforts to ensure the inclusion of women and minority clans in the process, with one praising their “amazing work”. Sources suggest that participants valued the role played by Zam Foundation in C17 in Hiran region and in C26 around Balanbale town in Galmudug, including their delivery and oversight of “peace dividend” community development projects and their effective facilitation of meetings between elders and SNA officials. Others in Case Study 19 reported that participants in the process expressed concerns over the extent of the local agency involved, suggesting that they were actively mediating rather than facilitating the process, a role they felt should have been performed by clan elders and which had the effect of diminishing the communities’ sense of ownership of the process. Two (Sa’ad) sources also reported a perceived pro-Saleebaan bias on the part of the organisation mediating the process, which they state undermined faith in the impartiality of the process and therefore adversely affected the outcome.

The picture relating to the impact of funding sources on outcomes is mixed. 5 of the 11 cases that were locally funded were successful (C01, C04, C06, CS8, C10), while 7 of the 12 successful cases were funded by international (6) or a mix of local and international (1) sources. Only 1 successful case study in Phase 2 was locally funded (CS8), while 3 were internationally funded (CS18, CS19, CS23), and 1 received a mix of local and international funding (CS15).

While the cases suggest that funding provided by international donors does appear to contribute to positive outcomes, the findings also provide evidence of the benefits of local funding in fostering a sense of local ownership of reconciliation processes. In C06, around Idale village in Bay region, the clans involved met the expenses of the Elay-led process through cash and in-kind contributions, with the Transitional Federal Government covering the expenses of the National Reconciliation Commission initiative, which sources report was critical to perceptions of community and Somali ownership of the outcome. A similar pattern emerged in C10, in which the community of Burtinle organised and funded the mediation effort, with additional financial and logistical support provided by the Majeerteen and Dhulbahante clans and the wider Harti community (including the diaspora),

the Puntland government, local NGOs, the business community, a women’s lobby group, and, to a lesser extent, the media. The district and regional governments provided funding for the destruction of the *berkedo* and compensation payments to their owners. These factors appear to have contributed to positive outcomes in these cases.

THE PROMINENT ROLE OF YOUTH

Youth are among the principal actors physically involved in armed conflict. Their responsibility for looking after animals means they are often involved in initial clashes resulting from interactions with rival clans at water points and grazing areas. They can also play essential roles in helping to end conflict. Actors like the Mudug Youth Integration Peace Forum (MYPIF), which played such an active part in Galkayo in Case Study 15, can play a similar role to women’s groups, helping to socialise the idea of peace within and between clans and more widely, through engaging in a range of activities to help bring communities together. In Galkayo, MYPIF promoted interaction and integration between the Habr Gidir and Majeerteen across the former divide in the city by organising events for women, youth, religious leaders, elders, business communities, and journalists from both communities in the north and south, conducting peace and conflict resolution training, delivering civic education courses, arranging inter-communal sports matches, and supporting orphanages for children who had lost their parents to the conflict.

All cases involving a prominent role of youth were successful (C10, CS15, C17, C26). Sources, however, identified resistance on the part of some elders to youth groups playing prominent roles in reconciliation processes. Findings from C17 and C26 suggest that this can be at least partly addressed by ensuring youth groups are given space to explain to elders their potentially beneficial role in processes and impact on outcomes, through identifying and explaining constructive activities like those identified above and using social media to disseminate the existence and content of peace agreements. Sources indicated that these kinds of discussions could lead to increased acceptance of youth involvement on the part of elders, which contributed to the development of more inclusive, and potentially successful, processes.

UPSTREAM INTERVENTIONS

The limited evidence provided by the 1 relevant case study featured in the research suggests that delivering upstream interventions in the context of the Wadajir Framework (WF), in locations that are not currently experiencing open conflict, may contribute to positive outcomes. Case Study 19 in Hobyo involved the establishment of a joint District Peace and Reconciliation Committee (DPRC) to discuss the underlying grievances between the Sa’ad and Saleebaan in and around Hobyo town in the first phase of the WF process. The DPRC led a series of reconciliation conferences at village then district levels resulting in a “social contract” between the two Hawiye sub-clans covering access to—and control over—resources and mechanisms to agree on revenue sharing for new infrastructure projects. The programme also delivered “peace dividend” community development activities, including the construction of district offices, rehabilitation of the airport, and construction of a maternity hospital. Sources confirmed that these activities had a beneficial impact in reducing the clan-based division of Hobyo town by promoting increased interaction between the communities.

Case Study 19, among others, provides further evidence of the impact of ongoing contestation around the federalisation process, and how the WF modality, and even the announcement of areas selected for its implementation, can exacerbate existing clan tensions around territorial control at the local level. Often, the announcement of the arrival of the WF in a location incentivises clans to seek to expand the areas under their control in an attempt to maximise their representation on district councils. This can make delivery of the WF stages, especially district council formation, even more challenging. While continuing disagreements between the Hawiye sub-clans prevented the formation of the district council in Case Study 19, the social reconciliation phase of the WF process did provide a framework within which these disagreements could be peacefully and constructively managed and their escalation to violence prevented, which may not have otherwise been the case. However, it is possible that establishing processes and structures (or utilising pre-existing ones) for discussion of contentious issues at an even earlier stage—before any announcements relating to the WF process triggering militia and political manoeuvres are made—may provide fora for the pre-emptive management of these issues.

This could lay a more robust foundation upon which the WF could subsequently build, and which may have enabled the successful district council formation that was not achieved in Case Study 19.

XEER

The findings confirm the primacy of Xeer as the mechanism most utilised by communities to resolve disputes. Even in cases where there was no ‘contractual’ Xeer between communities—agreements made at shir meetings to address specific issues such as clan boundaries and use of water resources (as was the case in Case Studies 9, 15 and 18)—the vaguer ‘Xeer by custom’, which comprises the traditions of a broader group that have developed over time, such as in the case of the ‘*Xeer Ciise*’ and ‘*Xeer Darod*’, provided a basic framework within which tensions could be addressed (if not always successfully). The popularity of Xeer may be partly explained by its prevalence in rural communities, the locus of most of the case studies, with the state system largely absent and Shari’a courts limited to urban areas. Still, the findings do not identify whether this preference is the result of the absence of those functioning alternatives. The popularity of Xeer is also likely connected with the legitimacy and credibility of elders in a given area, though the case studies did not provide specific evidence of this assertion.

As is well known, Xeer processes are usually not inclusive and often perpetuate structural power imbalances in Somali culture and society, particularly regarding women and minorities. In customary law processes, women are represented by their male elders and their concerns are heard indirectly. Compensation to women is usually awarded in smaller amounts than would be the case to men and is received by male relatives. Women themselves generally have limited participation in, or influence on, processes or outcomes.¹² In the cases identified, this is reflected in the entirely male composition of most Peace/Reconciliation Committees set up by elders to negotiate agreements that would effectively become new Xeers between the conflicting parties.

The focus of customary law on collective accountability rather than individual punishment is most often manifested through the pronouncement of diya payments owed by the patrilineal relatives of perpetrators to compensate aggrieved parties for killings. The protracted periods and continual cycles of violence that characterise many conflicts can lead to the cumulative amounts of outstanding diya payments, often on both sides of the conflict, becoming so large as to be unpayable in practice. The failure to pay on time and in full, and the frequent absence of effective enforcement tools available to elders, often contributed to the continuation or re-emergence of conflicts, as experienced in Case Study 9 across Galguduud and Mudug regions.

The peace agreement in C10 in Burtinle introduced what sources described as an “innovation” in specifying not only the amounts but also the required timeframes for diya payments; the absence of the latter often provided an excuse for non-payment which justified revenge attacks contributing to the continuation of the cycle of violence. An even more innovative approach was that instigated by the Somali National Movement (SNM) in C01. The Isaaq elders dominating the SNM and leading the wide-ranging reconciliation process adopted the principle of “*xalay dhalay*” (trans. “he was born yesterday”), a form of forgiveness used when diya amounts accumulated over decades of conflict are deemed incalculable and therefore expunged.

A further innovation of the Xeer agreements introduced in many parts of Somaliland as part of this process, and in the context of the general lawlessness following the Somali state collapse in 1991, was the elders’ deliberate decision to decree harsh punishments according to Shari’a to deter future violations of the peace. In the Somali setting, Xeer is considered to be based on Shari’a, although in practice there are some substantial differences between them.¹³ The adoption of the normative framework of the latter, with its greater focus on individual rather than collective accountability, meant that henceforth individual perpetrators and their families, rather than wider traditional diya-paying groups, would be held accountable for violations of the agreements. This innovation was intended to end the escalation of incidents and endless cycles of revenge attacks between clans resulting from the Somali cultural focus on collective accountability, typified in the custom

allowing generalised revenge killings, in which even distant relatives of the victim may kill a member of the extended family of the perpetrator.¹⁴ An amnesty was also announced, whereby all those from the region who had committed war crimes and crimes against humanity between 1981 and 1991 were unconditionally pardoned.¹⁵ The relative stability of Somaliland, especially when compared to the relative turbulence of south-central Somalia, in the years since these innovations in 1993 suggests that they made a positive contribution to the effectiveness and durability of the reconciliation process undertaken there.

It is important to note that for these changes in Xeer to be effectively implemented, the elders must have forged a consensus in their respective patrilineal descent groups. This is not a transparent process—often involving lengthy discussions and negotiations behind closed doors. The process must culminate with agreement between influential members of a group (e.g., respected elders, religious leaders, businesspeople, intellectuals, young fighters) to support the decision which is then publicly announced by the lineage or clan head.¹⁶ As well as the importance of facilitating these discussions, this illustrates the value of activities to sensitise the content of peace agreements in securing the broad-based community support needed to consolidate these developments in the Xeer.

This shift from collective towards individual responsibility for violations of peace agreements was also reflected in CS23 in Western Mudug (a success), in which the Sa’ad and Leelkase agreed that future criminal offenses between the two clans would be judged according to Shari’a, with judgments executed by the formal courts of Galmudug or Puntland. In C27 in Hirshabelle (a moderate success), the agreement provided that while diya for three people killed would be based on previous agreements, in future perpetrators would be punished according to Islamic law.¹⁷ In a similar approach to the amnesty used in Somaliland, in C06 (a success) the Hubeer and Yantaar utilised the principle of “*walaagi sanad hore la ha dhaafay lankii sheegada litun*” (trans. “the one who claims the issues of last year is a bad person”) to forgive all past losses and damages arising from the conflict, and sources stated that the accord in CS08 contained provisions relating to gembis (forgiveness and removal of the need for diya).

CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

The picture emerging from an analysis of the contextual factors that may affect outcomes is mixed:

- The presence of a dominant clan and high levels of respect for traditional authorities may contribute to positive outcomes. Case Study 8 took place in an area dominated by the Hawadle, who control much of the economic activity in Beletweyne and dominate the Hiran Council of Elders. An ugaas who enjoyed particularly high levels of trust among the Hawadle and all communities in Hiran led the process.
- 8 of the 24 cases in Phase 1 and 4 of the 9 cases in Phase 2 included contestation over political representation and control at the district or regional levels. While the sources referred to the impact of the implementation of the federalisation process in exacerbating local territorial disputes as a factor in 3 unsuccessful cases in Phase 1 (C05, C07, C14), it was also relevant in 2 successful cases in Phase 2 (CS15, CS23). However, given that sources in those 2 cases described it as an aggravating factor, it seems reasonable to characterise it as a factor contributing to negative outcomes, or at least not supporting positive outcomes.
- The presence of state security actors able to act in peace enforcement capacities in conflict areas, such as the Somali National Army (SNA), state or local police, and intelligence agencies, appears to contribute to positive outcomes. Such forces were present in 7 of the 9 case studies in Phase 2, including 4 successes and all 3 moderate successes. They were absent from 1 success (CS8, in which a joint standing committee of elders from the two conflicting clans, with the backing of the Hiran Council of Elders and the Hawadle ugaas, played the peace enforcement role) and the 1 failure (CS9).
- In 7 of the 8 case studies for which information is available, communities preferred to use Xeer over the formal justice sector or Al-Shabab Shari’a courts (this included CS21 which was mediated by AS, though, in that case, communities had no choice but to submit to the AS justice system). In only 1 case (CS25), sources identified a functioning state justice system that people appeared to use and have a degree of confidence in, which was in Kismayo, where the judiciary seems to function relatively better than in other areas of Jubbaland and the rest of south-central Somalia. It is not clear from the sources whether the communities’ preference for Xeer is based on the absence of functioning alternatives or genuine trust in processes and outcomes.

These factors illustrate the impact of the complex environment within which reconciliation processes take place and the difficulty in drawing definitive conclusions. The strongest evidence emerging from this picture is the positive impact of the presence of effective state security actors on outcomes. The significance of Xeer is perhaps not surprising, but the reasons for this are not explained by the research.

EMERGING LESSONS

The findings illustrate several themes emerging from the cases, which help to connect the analysis to the recommendations. Some are obvious and well-known but still bear articulating here, as they have implications for the recommendations for donor programming identified in the following section:

- Peace enforcement is a necessary component of successful reconciliation, however alone it is insufficient. While securing and enforcing a peace agreement is not reconciliation, the stability it affords helps to create the space in which broader reconciliation activities focussing on inter-clan relationships and trust building can be performed. It is these together which can lead to successful reconciliation.
- Peace enforcement is most effective when performed by community actors, security actors, or a combination of both.
- Communities value the role of effective security actors in enforcing agreements.
- Women are often more substantively involved in reconciliation processes than is captured by the literature.
- When donors and international agencies engage in local reconciliation processes, they should limit their visibility and ensure local ownership and leadership.
- Based on a limited dataset of 2 case studies, findings suggest that communities do not view AS reconciliation processes as effective or legitimate, and that the absence of meaningful inter-communal trust and relationship-building initiatives prevented effective and durable reconciliation.
- Communities do not express trust or confidence in the state justice system, preferring Xeer as their dispute resolution mechanism. This is likely influenced by the predominantly rural locations of the case studies, where Xeer is the most widely available system.
- Clarity on sanctions for transgressions, and in some cases introducing individual accountability, can be beneficial to preventing renewed conflict.
- The broader state building process and use of the 4.5 formula continue to exacerbate tensions between groups competing for territorial control and political representation at district, state, and federal levels.
- Socialisation of peace agreements, both during their development and after their establishment, can help to build community awareness, acceptance, and adherence of the terms of the agreement.



RECOMMENDATIONS

This section is divided into “recommendations” and “suggestions.” The recommendations are based on strong evidence of effective practices emerging from analysis of the cases selected for this study. The suggestions that follow, while supported by a less robust evidence base, still appear to warrant donors’ and agencies’ consideration.

DONORS SHOULD:

1. IN RELATION TO PEACE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS:

1.1 Encourage the parties to draft peace agreements with clear provisions, identifying transgressions and specifying sanctions for those transgressions. Those that hold individuals accountable, rather than the diya-paying group generically, appear to be most effective.

1.2 Encourage the parties to draft peace agreements that envisage enforcement mechanisms. Agreements without mechanisms to implement them, particularly to sanction violations, are not sufficient—they tend to be violated without consequences, and small incidents tend to escalate into inter-group conflict. Mechanisms that envisage complementary roles for community and security actors appear to be the most effective.

1.3 Support the formation of joint or integrated units, both financially and organisationally. Joint or integrated units need stipends, supplies, and operating costs. Specific organisational arrangements are needed for a meaningful integration process, ensuring militia do not maintain their unit formation and command.

1.4 Ensure that security forces deployed to enforce the agreement are appropriate for the context, and make sure that local communities and relevant military, state, and district officials have a say in their formation and deployment. Where appropriate, and using trusted interlocutors, engage with influential local government officials, SNA commanders, and police commissioners on how to create new joint or integrated units to deliver a sustainable peace enforcement function.

1.5 Ensure that both community and security institutions in peace enforcement mechanisms are inclusive and representative. Start with broad community discussions, including women and the

youth, to inform their membership and articulate their roles. Practical arrangements, with established processes and routines, such as monthly meetings with security and political actors, and with community groups overseeing broader reconciliation activities, enhance the chances that these mechanisms function effectively.

1.6 Deliver programmes in areas with existing effective security actors, or support their development where necessary, either through incorporating capacity-building activities into programme design or partnering/co-locating with organisations able to do so. These could be supply-side programmes such as SSJP and ERI, or demand-side actors like LPI/SWSO, Saferworld, Berghof Foundation, and Conflict Dynamics International. These options would help to ensure the presence of army or police units in programme locations with the technical, logistical, and administrative capabilities necessary to provide effective enforcement of peace agreements, as well as the transparency and accountability required to gain communities’ trust and deliver adequate local security services.

2. IN RELATION TO BROADER RECONCILIATION ACTIVITIES:

2.1 Incorporate a broad set of activities in support of reconciliation into programme design, based on community needs identified through participatory discussions and context analysis.

2.2 Ensure activities intended to build trust and strengthen relationships between communities are designed and delivered in an inclusive way, with participatory discussions to ensure the active involvement of women and youth groups, as well as minority clans where appropriate.

2.3 Link any structures created to implement and oversee broader reconciliation activities with peace enforcement actors through regular meetings to share information, allowing members of both to develop an overview of the reconciliation process and identify any locations or issues that may benefit from targeted interventions as a result of ongoing or developing conflict dynamics.

3. IN RELATION TO THE ROLE OF WOMEN:

3.1 Understand local gender dynamics and their likely impact on the programme. This should include the identification of champions, enablers, and blockers of increased women’s participation in programme locations, together with appropriate plans for engagement with each group.

3.2 Arrange consultations at community level at the start of reconciliation processes, ensuring that some are led by elders. These should build support for the inclusion of women in the process—including among women themselves—identifying their roles and discussing the obstacles to their participation. This could include arranging opportunities for elders who have been involved in successful reconciliation processes involving women in prominent roles to share their experiences and identify the practical benefits of women’s participation and its impact on outcomes.

3.3 Design appropriate activities to facilitate women’s participation in processes, based on the results of the initial discussions and analysis. These could include separate women’s reconciliation conferences running prior to—or parallel with—“main” processes, or encouraging and supporting women’s participation in the “main” process.

3.4 Target capacity-building support to address the needs of individual women and women’s groups in programme locations. This could include organisational support, advocacy, public speaking, and leadership training.

3.5 Identify and engage trusted women’s groups that are rooted in local communities, can mobilise intercommunal support, and help to deliver relevant activities.

4. IN RELATION TO EFFECTIVE MEDIATORS:

4.1 Ensure that the context analysis clarifies the power dynamics between the conflicting clans and other clans in the area, together with other

potentially relevant stakeholders, to help identify both the potential identity of, and need for, effective mediators.

4.2 Design metrics to monitor the levels of support of conflicting parties and wider communities for any mediator, to ensure that they maintain the trust of the parties and continue to play an impartial and effective role throughout the process.

5. IN RELATION TO THE ROLE OF YOUTH:

5.1 Encourage the creation of space for intergenerational dialogue at the outset of reconciliation processes. This can help develop elders’ appreciation of youth groups’ skills and their potential contributions, build a sense of shared purpose between them, and encourage an inclusive rather than elder-dominated process. Research demonstrated that when elders are more aware of the benefits that youth can bring to a peacebuilding initiative, they tend to include and support their participation, and that the youth’s participation can contribute to mitigating the risk of violence and build cross-community relations in support of more durable reconciliation.

5.2 Identify youth groups that are trusted and valued by communities, check their track record, and consider engaging with them as both partners and beneficiaries.

6. IN RELATION TO LOCAL OWNERSHIP AND FUNDING:

6.1 Avoid engaging with processes that have effective local leadership and sufficient local funding, and which donor interventions may destabilise. By default, donors should not engage in local reconciliation processes unless there are evident gaps that could not be filled otherwise. The evidence suggests that when credible elders oversee processes, and local communities finance them and so have “skin in the game”, they are more committed to see it through—and to a constructive outcome.

6.2 Continue to work through local partners who have the trust of their communities, and when there are evident gaps that can only be filled through donor intervention, provide funding, technical advice, facilitation, and logistical support, and keep donor visibility in reconciliation processes to a minimum.

DONORS SHOULD CONSIDER:

7. IN RELATION TO UPSTREAM INTERVENTIONS:

7.1 Coordinating with the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs, and Reconciliation and the National Reconciliation Framework, and targeting interim district administrations to deliver upstream interventions in locations ahead of the announcement of Wadajir Framework initiatives. This would involve establishing new, or repurposing existing, community-based structures to provide fora to proactively manage local-level tensions in advance of the announcement of the district council formation process, as this could trigger overt competition and contestation for territorial control which could escalate to violence. Examples of existing donor-funded community structures that could be adapted and utilised for this purpose include: the District Peace Committees developed by Conflict Dynamics International in all Federal Member States and the Benadir Regional Authority in 2016–2017; Saferworld’s Community Action Fora established in Mogadishu, Kismayo, and Baidoa in 2017–2019; and the Community Action Plans developed in Afmadow district in Jubbaland as part of Katuni Consult’s Citizen-Directed Negotiated Accountability programme in 2015. There are doubtless others.

8. IN RELATION TO XEER:

8.1 Convening participatory discussions at the outset of reconciliation processes with influential members of Somali society who would need to agree to any innovations of the Xeer (respected elders, religious leaders, businesspeople, intellectuals, young fighters), including consideration of: i) amnesties; ii) attempts to ensure diya payments are realistic and affordable, or represent symbolic payments; and iii) moving towards a system of greater individual accountability, including the adoption of sanctions for violations of peace agreements based on Shari’a or, where feasible, statutory criminal law. These elements could be coordinated with, or incorporated into, wider donor-supported justice sector capacity-building programmes.

8.2 Developing tools to help sensitise wider communities to the benefits of any shift in approach away from established Somali custom resulting from the above discussions, such as local media products and further participatory discussions bringing together women’s and youth groups and security and government officials, and designing external communications strategies to mitigate the reputational risks to donors associated with any initiative promoting the wider use of Shari’a. This could also involve sharing examples of, and lessons from, innovations in the Xeer in other successful cases and how they contributed to positive outcomes.

9. IN RELATION TO AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH:

9.1 Undertaking a deeper investigation to better understand the gendered dimensions of conflict and reconciliation processes and their impact on outcomes. This would explore how the roles of people in conflict and reconciliation processes reflect wider societal gender constructs, and how a better understanding of these might contribute to the identification of the most effective ways to secure the meaningful participation of women, as well as how to generate acceptance and support from traditionally resistant groups.

9.2 Identifying the connections between conflicts and reconciliation and wider state-building processes, including the formalisation and regularisation of land tenure and the potential impact this could have on mitigating intercommunal conflict in Somalia.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Phase 1 and 2 reports with the case study analyses are available upon request with SSF.
- 2 National Reconciliation Framework, Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation, Version 8, March 7, 2019, p9.
- 3 Brouneus, Karen. Reconciliation: Theory and Practice for Development Cooperation. SIDA. (2003) and KII S_LR_S13-010-1.
- 4 KII S_LR_S13-010-1
- 5 GIST Research, Deep-Dive Context Analysis in Galmudug’s Western Corridor, for IOM, June 2021.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Comprehensive Review Marka Reconciliations Key findings.pdf Gist Research - unpublished
- 8 Women, Conflict and Peace: Learning from Kismayo, Life & Peace Institute, April 2018, pp44-45 - link
- 9 P1-10-1
- 10 Learning from Kismayo, Life & Peace Institute, pp62-64 - link
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Transitional Justice in Somalia: A Review, GIST Research Ltd, August 2021, p17
- 13 Battera, Frederico 2005: The collapse of the state and the resurgence of customary law in northern Somalia. In: W. Dostal and W. Kraus (eds.): Shattering Tradition: Custom, law and the individual in the Muslim Mediterranean. London: Tauris: pp287, 298, cited in *ibid.*, p24
- 14 Hoehne, Markus V. 2011: Political Orientations and Repertoires of Identification: State and Identity Formation in Northern Somalia. PhD Dissertation Martin-Luther Universität Halle-Wittenberg, pp100-101; and Schlee, Günther 2013: Customary law and the joys of statelessness: Idealised traditions versus Somali realities. *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 7(3), cited in *ibid.*, p 18
- 15 Adam Haji Ali Ahmed, 'Politics of Transitional Justice Mechanisms from Below: The Case of Somaliland' in (2010) *Peace & Conflict Monitor*, available at <http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=732> accessed 16 November 2018, cited in *ibid.*, p19
- 16 Ibid..
- 17 At the time of the research, in July 2021, limited information relating to this case was available, and the agreement had only been concluded in the same month.

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'A STRING IS NEEDED TO GATHER SCATTERED BEADS'

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